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WORK MADE FOR HIRE—
ANALYZING THE MULTIFACTOR BALANCING TEST
RYAN VACCA*
ABSTRACT
Authorship of copyrighted works is oftentimes controlled by the 1976 Copyright Act’s
work made for hire doctrine. This doctrine states that works created by employees within the
scope of their employment result in the employer, not the employee, being the author and
initial copyright owner. One key determination in this analysis is whether the hired party is
an employee or independent contractor. In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, in CCNV v. Reid,
set forth a list of factors to distinguish employees from independent contractors. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not give further guidance on how to balance these factors.
Three years later, in 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Aymes v.
Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equally weighted and that five of the factors would
―be significant in virtually every situation.‖ This analysis was supported by looking at all
the work made for hire cases decided in the three year period since Reid—six cases in total.
This Article expands in both scope and time what the Second Circuit did in Aymes and
systematically analyzes how courts have utilized the factors in the twenty-five years since
Reid. In particular, this study has identified the universe of cases where the courts have
decided whether a hired party was an employee or independent contractor and uses the data
from these cases to describe what factors appear to be the most and least important in reaching these conclusions. Based on the results of this study, this Article proposes a continuum
of importance, which graphically illustrates the relative importance of each factor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Authorship plays a central role in copyright law.1 Conferring this
title on people or entities bestows on them initial ownership of the
copyright2 and the power to exploit the associated rights.3 Hence, it is
no surprise that authorship is an oft-disputed issue between parties
contesting the use of copyrighted works.4
In many circumstances, determining authorship is easy, because
the general rule is that ―the author is the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression . . . .‖5 The artist who paints a bowl of fruit in her
home studio on the weekend to sell at a community art show is an
easy example of the traditional notion of authorship. The glaring exception to this general rule is the ―work made for hire‖ doctrine. In
part, this doctrine provides that ―a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment‖6 is consequently owned by
the employer.7 But the work made for hire doctrine does not simply
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖ (emphasis added)); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ―Authorship,‖ 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991) (― ‗[A]uthorship‘ . . . is arguably the most central, and
certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with Anglo-American
copyright doctrine.‖).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
3. Id. § 106 (―[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following[]. . . .‖); id. § 106A(a)(1) (―[T]he author of a work of
visual art—shall have the right[]. . . .‖).
4. See, e.g., JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010); Martha Graham
Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d
624 (2d Cir. 2004); Numbers Licensing, L.L.C. v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245
(E.D. Wash. 2009); Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2008);
Int‘l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat‘l Fire Prot. Ass‘n, No. 02C5610, 2006 WL 850879 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 27, 2006); Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
5. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining work made for hire).
7. Id. § 201(b).
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change initial ownership of the copyright.8 This doctrine has found its
way into several other issues, such as modifying the duration of the
copyright,9 eliminating the right to terminate transfers of copyright,10
and prohibiting the acquisition of moral rights.11
But unlike Hamlet, where the question was ―to be, or not to be,‖12
for the work made for hire doctrine, the question is ―employee or independent contractor?‖ Distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the 1976 Copyright Act‘s work made for
hire doctrine is an essential problem courts and parties need to resolve before proceeding to analyze how ownership, duration, terminations of transfers, and moral rights are affected.13
Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to give
guidance to judges and parties involved in disputes over the employment status of hired individuals.14 In 1989, the Court issued its opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid15 and declared
that distinguishing employees from independent contractors should
be accomplished by using a multifactor balancing test.16 This test,
which uses approximately a dozen factors, clarified what the proper
test was but spawned questions about how those factors are balanced
and which factors, if any, are the most important in the analysis.17
Three years after Reid, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equally weighted.18 The court in Aymes went further still and opined that
five of the factors would ―be significant in virtually every situation.‖19

8. Jon M. Garon & Elaine D. Ziff, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine Revisited:
Startup and Technology Employees and the Use of Contracts in a Hiring Relationship, 12
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 489, 490 (2011).
9. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (providing that copyright generally persists for the life
of the author plus seventy years), with id. § 302(c) (providing that copyright in a work
made for hire ―endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a
term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first‖).
10. Id. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright[]. . . is subject to termination . . . .‖); see also id. § 304(c), (d) (same exclusion but applied to a different set of transfers).
11. See id. § 106A(a) (granting moral rights to ―the author of a work of visual art‖);
id. § 101(2)(B) (defining ―work of visual art‖ as not including a work made for hire).
12. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 1.
13. See Garon & Ziff, supra note 8.
14. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 751-52.
17. See infra Parts II.E–F.
18. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
19. Id.
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This analysis was supported by reviewing all the work made for hire
cases decided in the three-year period since Reid—six cases in total.20
This Article greatly expands upon the Second Circuit‘s work in
Aymes. It is the first study to comprehensively and systematically
analyze the work made for hire factors and show their relative importance in distinguishing employees from independent contractors.
It contributes to the existing and highly-regarded literature of empirical studies analyzing multifactor tests.21 Using a data set consisting
of the population of work made for hire cases decided since Reid
where the courts determined the status of the hired party, this Article illustrates which factors are the most and least important in
drawing this distinction. These results confirm, in part, what the Second Circuit in Aymes believed—that a small subset of factors is important.22 Likewise, these results show that some factors originally
thought to be important are not terribly important and that other
factors originally thought to be of only moderate importance are actually very important.23
Part II provides historical background on the work made for hire
doctrine and illustrates how the doctrine has evolved from when its
foundation was laid in the mid-1800s through the Second Circuit‘s
1992 decision in Aymes.24 Specifically, during the course of this discussion, I describe the legislative histories leading up to the codification of the work made for hire doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act25
and the circuit split occurring after its enactment, which eventually
led to the Supreme Court‘s resolution in Reid.26 Part II concludes by
recounting the Supreme Court‘s rationale for adopting the multifactor test in Reid27 and the Second Circuit‘s explanation of the important and unimportant factors in Aymes.28
Part III describes the methodology and results of this study.29 This
Part explains the type of data collected, describes how this data is
used to show four different measures of importance, and displays
20. See id. at 862 (citing six cases decided between 1990 and 1992).
21. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Kevin Blum et
al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2010).
22. See infra Part II.F.
23. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Parts II.A–C.
26. See infra Part II.D.
27. See infra Part II.E.
28. See infra Part II.F.
29. See infra Part III.
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how each factor ranks using each measure.30 Most importantly, based
on the results of these measures, I propose a continuum of importance for the Reid factors.31 This continuum groups together factors sharing similar features with respect to the measures of importance.32 Part III concludes by testing how useful the continuum is
at predicting the ultimate outcome of the work made for hire cases.33
Part IV first attempts to situate the results of this study within
the historical development of the work made for hire doctrine and see
whether these results cohere with the Supreme Court‘s rationales for
adopting and rejecting the various interpretations existing before
Reid.34 Part IV then considers the implications of this study, paying
attention to litigation and business-planning contexts.35 Special attention is drawn toward terminations of transfers litigation involving
sound recordings as a case study on how the results of this study may
ultimately affect the outcome of this impending litigation.36
II. AUTHORSHIP AND THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
To understand the modern work made for hire doctrine, it is necessary to appreciate how it came into being. Many of the changes taking place in 1976 and subsequent interpretations were heavily influenced by earlier copyright acts and how courts construed the work
made for hire doctrine. The most significant of these early acts was
the 1909 Copyright Act. This part of the Article briefly describes the
work made for hire doctrine during the pre-1909 period and then discusses the codification of this doctrine in the 1909 Act and how the
courts gradually, but greatly, modified this doctrine. Afterwards, this
part describes the legislative history leading to the 1976 Act and the
final codification in section 101, which left courts struggling with how
to determine whether a hired party was an employee or independent
contractor. Next, this part explains the four approaches lower courts
used in making this determination before the Supreme Court resolved the issue in its historic 1989 case—CCNV v. Reid. Finally, it
describes how the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli put an additional gloss on Reid, which serves as the jumping off point for this
study and is fully explored in Parts III and IV.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part III.
See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B.
See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B.
See infra Fig. 2 and preceding discussion in Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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A. Pre-1909 Case Law
The earliest appearance of the work made for hire doctrine (or at
least the foundation for the doctrine) occurred in the 1860s.37 Prior to
this time, hiring parties were never entitled to the copyright of the
parties they hired absent an agreement assigning the copyright to
the hiring party.38 As such, no distinction was drawn between employees and independent contractors, because hiring parties were not
entitled to the copyright by virtue of employment.39
During the 1860s, a shift occurred and courts began to recognize
that hiring parties did have a copyright interest in the works prepared by those they hired to create.40 One of the earliest cases laying
the foundation for the work made for hire doctrine was Keene v.
Wheatley.41 Keene involved the famous play, Our American Cousin.42
In relevant part, the British author, Tom Taylor, sold the American
rights to Laura Keene, a New York City theater owner.43 Joseph Jefferson, an actor in Keene‘s company, adapted the play for performance in Keene‘s New York theater.44 The play became a huge success in New York, and Jefferson sold his additions in the play to
Wheatley and John Clark, two Philadelphia theater producers, who
had previously acquired a British copy of the play.45 After a successful exhibition of the play in Philadelphia, Keene filed suit alleging
copyright infringement.46 The court held that Keene did not have a
valid copyright to the original version of the play, because Taylor was
not a U.S. resident.47 Notwithstanding this ruling, the court also held
that Keene could seek a remedy against Wheatley and John Clark for
Jefferson‘s additions to the play.48 As the court explained:
Mr. Jefferson, while in the general theatrical employment of the
complainant, engaged in the particular office of assisting in the
adaptation of this play; and made the additions in question in the
course of his willing performance of this duty. She consequently
37. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine, 15
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (―The concept began to appear after 1860.‖).
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644).
42. Id. at 181. Our American Cousin is famously known as the play occurring at
Ford‘s Theater the night President Lincoln was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth. Fisk,
supra note 37, at 38 n.125.
43. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 182.
44. Id.
45. Fisk, supra note 37, at 37-38.
46. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 184.
47. Id. at 185; Fisk, supra note 37, at 39-40.
48. Fisk, supra note 37, at 40.
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became the proprietor of them as products of his intellectual exertion in a particular service in her employment.49

In particular, the court declined to hold that Keene was entitled to
the copyright as a matter of statutory copyright law but, instead,
based its holding on equitable principles.50
Eight years later, in Lawrence v. Dana,51 a federal court collapsed
the distinction between statutory copyright law and equitable principles.52 Lawrence involved an international law treatise written by
Henry Wheaton.53 Upon Henry Wheaton‘s death, his wife, Catharine,
sought the assistance of William Lawrence to prepare a new edition
of the treatise.54 As part of the agreement between Catharine and
Lawrence, Catharine agreed to not make use of Lawrence‘s notes in a
new edition of the treatise without his consent.55 Subsequent litigation over the treatise ensued, and in dictum the court indicated that
had the parties not entered into a contract for Lawrence to retain the
copyright, Catharine would have owned the copyright because of the
employment relationship between them.56 This dictum was repeated
throughout the rest of the nineteenth century as courts reallocated
copyright ownership by including an implied contract between the
parties that favored the hiring party owning the copyright.57 Despite
courts entertaining the idea of the hiring party owning the copyright
in the absence of an express assignment to that effect, there was confusion about whether the default rule favored the hiring or hired party.58 The cause for this shift from a default rule of hired party ownership to a default rule of hiring party ownership is muddled.59 Nonetheless, one thing is clear—the courts deciding copyright cases during
this period drew no distinction between employees and independent
contractors like is done in the modern context.60

49. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 187.
50. Id.; Fisk, supra note 37, at 40.
51. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
52. Fisk, supra note 37, at 43.
53. Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 26.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 51; Fisk, supra note 37, at 43.
57. Fisk, supra note 37, at 45.
58. Id. at 47 (―By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the law of employee
copyrights was highly uncertain and the results of cases were quite unpredictable.‖).
59. Id. at 45 (suggesting the cause of this shift was based on (1) reflecting the intent of
most parties, (2) employers having a stronger moral claim, or (3) changing assumptions
about the nature of authorship).
60. Id. at 46.
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It was not until nearly the turn of the century that the principle of
hiring party-owned copyrights was more firmly established.61 In
1899, the court in Colliery Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence
Schools62 noted that it was the employer of a salaried employee who
was the copyright owner of instructional materials for a correspondence school.63 The following year, the court in Dielman v. White64 held
that ―when an artist is commissioned to execute a work of art not in
existence at the time the commission is given, the burden of proving
that he retains a copyright in the work of art executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests heavily upon the artist himself.‖65
B. The 1909 Act
After an uncertain history, Congress finally recognized the work
made for hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909.66 The 1909 Act
provided that ―the word ‗author‘ shall include an employer in the case
of works made for hire.‖67 This provision of the 1909 Act resulted
from a meeting in 1905 between industry leaders and the American
Authors‘ League.68 The initial draft stated that only ―authors‖ could
obtain copyright, but industry leaders objected.69 The Copyright Office proposed a revised bill that did not have a general work made for
hire provision, but instead had a section indicating that the ―publisher
of a composite or collective work . . . which has been produced at his
instance and expense‖ would be entitled to a copyright.70 However, industry leaders were still unsatisfied. As one participant complained:
We have people who work for us who make engravings or etchings
for us under salary. Under the new law—if it becomes a law as
drafted—they would have the right to copyright, and I think it
would be well to express in such a law that where no agreement
exists to the contrary the payment of a salary to an employee shall
entitle an employer to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work

61. Id. at 55.
62. Colliery Eng‘r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
63. Fisk, supra note 37, at 59-60.
64. Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
65. Id. at 894.
66. Michael B. Landau, ―Works Made For Hire‖ After Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid: The Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 110 (1990).
67. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (repealed 1976).
68. Fisk, supra note 37, at 63.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 64 (citing 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxiv (B. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)).
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performed during the hours for which such salary is paid. It seems
to me these things should not be left to the courts to decide. 71

Interestingly, this comment indicates that some industry leaders believed that the copyright in works created by salaried employees during their employment would belong to the employer.72 The Copyright
Office was persuaded by such comments and prepared another draft
of the bill, which credited authorship to ―[a]n employer, in the case of
a work produced by an employee during the hours for which his salary is paid, subject to any agreement to the contrary.‖73 Later, in 1906,
Congress held joint hearings and produced the language ultimately
ending up in the 1909 Act—―the word ‗author‘ shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.‖74 Unfortunately, Congress
failed to define ―work made for hire‖ and ―employer.‖75
One of the earliest cases interpreting the 1909 Act‘s work made for
hire provision was National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman.76 In Kaufman, the plaintiff, a corporation, claimed a copyright in a fashion
book.77 The defendant reproduced portions of this book and, when sued
for copyright infringement, moved to dismiss.78 In the course of its
opinion, the Second Circuit discussed the newly enacted 1909 Act and
the work made for hire doctrine.79 Importantly, the court noted that
―[under the previous law], as well as now, the employer had the right
to the copyright in the literary product of a salaried employ[ee].‖80
The last major development in the work made for hire doctrine
before enactment of the 1976 Act was Brattleboro Publishing Co. v.
Winmill Publishing Corp.81 In Brattleboro, newspaper advertisers
hired the Brattleboro Daily Reformer, a local newspaper, to create
advertisements.82 These advertisements appeared in the Brattleboro
Daily Reformer and subsequently appeared in the Brattleboro Town
Crier, a direct-mail circular.83 The Brattleboro Daily Reformer sued
the Brattleboro Town Crier for copyright infringement for reproduc-

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 65).
See id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 65).
Id. at 66 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at xxx).
Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, pt. J).
1
MELVILLE
B.
NIMMER
&
DAVID
NIMMER,
NIMMER
COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1][a][i] (2014).
76. Nat‘l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911).
77. Id. at 216.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 217.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Brattleboro Publ‘g Co. v. Winmill Publ‘g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. Id. at 568.
83. Id. at 567.
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ing the advertisements.84 On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that
in determining whether a work was a work made for hire under the
1909 Act, it applied the ―instance and expense‖ test.85 That is, the
copyright is owned by ―the person at whose instance and expense the
work is done.‖86 In Brattleboro, the court held that the advertisers,
who hired the newspaper, were the copyright owners of the advertisements.87 Importantly, the Second Circuit opined that the ―instance and expense‖ test applied regardless of whether the hired party was a traditional employee or an independent contractor.88 Collapsing the distinction between employees and independent contractors laid the foundation for some of the confusion arising from the
1976 Act‘s work made for hire provision.
C. The 1976 Act—Legislative History and Statutory Text
The deluge of technological advancements created in the wake of
the 1909 Act caused the judges interpreting it to stretch the statutory
language to its limits to accommodate these developments.89 As a result, in 1955, Congress decided to overhaul the 1909 Act, which included funding thirty-five studies on copyright issues.90 One of these
studies, study number thirteen, published in 1958, focused on the
work made for hire issue and reported the then-current state of the
law under the 1909 Act.91
Based on these studies, the Copyright Office prepared a report on
copyright law revisions, including recommendations on how to deal
with the work made for hire issues.92 This 1961 report recommended
that works made for hire be defined as ―works created by an employee within the regular scope of his employment‖93 and suggested that
commissioned works fell outside this definition.94 Following publica84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 567-68; see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir. 2004).
89. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1987).
90. I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law’s Concept of Employment—What Congress Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 210, 222 (1988); Litman, supra note 89, at 872.
91. See Borge Varmer, Works Made for Hire and on Commission (1958), reprinted in
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(Comm. Print 1960).
92. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REG. REP.]; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224.
93. 1961 REG. REP., supra note 92, at app. 14–114; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224.
94. 1961 REG. REP., supra note 92, at app. 14–113, 14–114; Hardy, supra note 90, at 224.
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tion of the 1961 report, stakeholders voiced their concerns about the
recommendations.95 One objection lodged by the motion picture industry concerned the use of the phrase ―regular scope of employment‖
in the definition.96 The movie studios thought this language narrowed
what the studios had typically been able to claim as their own.97 None
of the objections concerned the understanding of what the term ―employee‖ meant.98 In fact, as Professor Trotter Hardy describes it, the
comments to the 1961 report implicitly recognized ―employee‖ to
mean formal employees—those paid on a regular schedule.99
After these discussions, the Copyright Office published a ―Preliminary Draft Bill‖ in 1963.100 This bill defined work made for hire as ―a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his
employment, but not including a work made on special order or commission.‖101 Although the 1963 Preliminary Draft Bill included a few
changes to the work made for hire doctrine, it did not define the term
―employee.‖102 Stakeholders‘ understanding of the term ―employee‖
became clear as a result of the objections to the provision in the 1963
Preliminary Draft Bill stating that specially ordered or commissioned
works were not works made for hire.103 As the stakeholders argued
about the status of commissioned works, they frequently contrasted
commissioned individuals with employees.104 Again, as Professor
Hardy articulately describes, these references to employees almost
always describe employees as individuals who were formal employees—those who were on the payroll and paid a regular salary.105

95. Hardy, supra note 90, at 225-28; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
96. Hardy, supra note 90, at 225 n.66.
97. See id. Another objection to the proposal was that employers would not be considered authors, but merely owners of the copyright. Id. at 226.
98. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS
ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 152-60 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter 1963 REG. REP.].
99. Hardy, supra note 90, at 226-27.
100. Id. at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
101. Hardy, supra note 90, at 228 (emphasis added); see also Landau, supra note 66,
at 115.
102. Hardy, supra note 90, at 229.
103. Id. at 232-35. The debate about commissioned works was that federal copyright
law would preempt common law copyright, which had treated hiring parties that commissioned works as the copyright owner. In effect, commissioned works were treated similarly
to employee-created works, but with preemption in effect that common law development
would no longer exist and the hiring party would not own the copyright unless the hired
party agreed to assign it. This, in conjunction with the introduction of the termination of
transfer provisions, which did not apply to works made for hire, caused much consternation
for film, textbook, and reference publishers. Id. at 229-32.
104. Id. at 232-35.
105. Id.
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Following this set of discussions, Congress introduced the 1964
bill,106 which included commissioned works within the definition of
―work made for hire.‖107 In fact, the 1964 bill provided that any specially ordered or commissioned work would be a work made for hire ―if the
parties so agree[d] in writing.‖108 This one hundred eighty degree
change on specially commissioned works raised objections from individual creators who had been routinely hired as independent contractors, especially members of the Authors League.109 After much haranguing, the two sides of the work made for hire debate were able to
find some common ground and agreed that some types of specially
commissioned works should be works made for hire, while other types
were not appropriate for that treatment.110 Because the focus of this
round of discussions centered on specially commissioned parties, rather
than employees, nothing was said on what constituted an employee.111
At last, in 1965, Congress introduced two bills112 which defined
―work made for hire‖ as ―a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment‖113 and also specially ordered or commissioned works falling within four categories of works, including a
contribution to a collective work, parts of a motion picture, translations, and supplementary works, if the parties expressly agreed in
writing that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.114 After further discussions, this list of categories was expanded to include
compilations, instructional texts, tests, atlases, and answer materials
for a test.115 In the Congressional hearing, industry witnesses again
106. Technically, Congress introduced three identical bills—S. 3008, H.R. 11947, and
H.R. 12354. For the sake of simplicity I refer to them collectively as the ―1964 bill.‖ See
Hardy, supra note 90, at 236.
107. Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
108. Hardy, supra note 90, at 236; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
109. Hardy, supra note 90, at 237. These individuals were concerned that they could
easily be forced to sign a contract declaring that the work was a work made for hire and, as
a result, their termination rights would never exist. Landau, supra note 66, at 115-16.
110. Hardy, supra note 90, at 238.
111. See generally 1963 REG. REP., supra note 98 (some commentators noting their
concerns about including specially commissioned works resulting in too little protection for
authors; some commentators noting that a substantial percentage of audio-visual materials
are specially commissioned and that the proposed law needs to be changed).
112. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (Comm. Print 1965).
113. Landau, supra note 66, at 116 (internal quotations omitted).
114. Hardy, supra note 90, at 238-40; Landau, supra note 66, at 116. One of the driving
forces behind these debates about the work made for hire definition was the new termination of transfers provisions. See Landau, supra note 66, at 116 (―[I]n exchange for concessions from publishers on provisions relating to termination rights, the authors consented to
a second subsection . . . .‖).
115. Landau, supra note 66 at 117. The stakeholders involved in negotiating these
categories—hence the seemingly random collection of included works—were representatives of the Authors League of America, the Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Institutions
and Organizations, the American Guild of Authors and Composers, the American Textbook
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focused on the specially commissioned works; but in reference to this
issue, they explained their understanding of what an employee was.116
As they had in the past, the stakeholders considered employees as
those who were paid a salary for either a fixed or indefinite term.117
After more than a decade of debates about the work made for hire
doctrine, the statutory language had been worked out and was enacted, albeit a decade later, in the 1976 Copyright Act.118 In relevant
part, the definition of ―work made for hire‖ now reads:
A ―work made for hire‖ is—
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material
for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire.119

Although the 1976 Copyright Act uses the phrase ―a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,‖ it fails to
define the term ―employee.‖120 Nonetheless, given the extensive legislative history, one possibility was that everyone understood the term
to mean those who were formal, salaried employees.121
D. Different Interpretations of ―Employee‖ Under the 1976 Act
The 1976 Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978, and
courts were quickly confronted with the task of having to interpret
the work made for hire language in the statute.122 During the course
of the following eleven years, the lower courts adopted four different
tests to determine whether a hired party was an employee under the
first prong of the work made for hire definition.123
Publishers‘ Institute, the American Book Publishers Council, and the Motion Picture Association of America. Litman, supra note 89, at 890-91 nn.216-18.
116. Hardy, supra note 90, at 239.
117. Id. (discussing the testimony of Adolph Schimel on behalf of the Motion Picture
Association of America).
118. Landau, supra note 66, at 117.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining work made for hire).
120. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
121. Hardy, supra note 90, at 241; Litman, supra note 89, at 890.
122. Marita Covarrubias, Note, The Supreme Court Sculpts a Definition . . . Is It a
Work for Hire?, 10 LOY. ENT. L.J. 353, 365 (1990).
123. Landau, supra note 66, at 120-21.
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1. Right to Control Test
The first test was known as the ―right to control‖ test.124 Under
this test, courts looked at ―whether the alleged employer has the
right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work.‖125 This test was borrowed from case law interpreting
the 1909 Act.126
One of the first cases adopting the right to control test was Town
of Clarkstown v. Reeder.127 In Reeder, the town decided to establish a
civic project, known as a Youth Court.128 As part of this project, the
town‘s Youth Court Executive Board formed various sub-committees,
including a Constitution Committee and Steering Committee.129 Michael Reeder voluntarily served on each of these committees.130 As
part of his role on the Steering Committee, Reeder was tasked with
preparing a manual for the Youth Court.131 Reeder drafted the manual ―after receiving conceptual and practical input from many people,‖ including guidance from members of the different committees
and Executive Board.132 The chairman of the Executive Board relayed
feedback from the committees to Reeder and served as a sounding
board as Reeder prepared the manual.133
Shortly after the manual was complete, Reeder contracted with
another town to help them create a Youth Court and asserted a copyright in the Clarkstown manual.134 Initially, Reeder granted Clarkstown a license, but after the Executive Committee requested Reeder
to assign the copyright to the town, Reeder revoked the license and
litigation ensued.135 At issue was whether Reeder was an employee of
the town and, as a result, whether the manual was a work made for
hire with the copyright belonging to the town.136
The court held that Reeder, despite the fact that he volunteered
his time, was the town‘s employee.137 The court held that the crucial
factor in determining whether Reeder was an employee ―is whether
124. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738.
125. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
126. See id. (citing Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 744 (2d
Cir. 1975); Roy Exp. Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 137-38.
129. Id. at 138.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 139.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 139-40.
136. Id. at 140-41.
137. Id. at 141-42.
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the alleged employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work.‖138 The town had this
right to direct and supervise the manner in which the manual was
created because (1) the Chairman of the Executive Board had the
power to remove and appoint members; (2) Reeder and the Chairman
had ongoing discussions about drafting the manual, including what
to include and change; (3) the Chairman assigned Reeder and another volunteer to prepare other documents and they did; and (4) Reeder
submitted proposals to the committees and Executive Board for approval.139 The fact that no one from the town ever ordered Reeder to
write the manual in a specific format was not dispositive.140 The court
emphasized that the employment relationship depended on having
the right to control, not exercising the right.141
The court‘s justification for this interpretation of the term ―employee‖ in the 1976 Act leaves much to be desired. Rather than looking at
the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court reached its conclusion
about how to distinguish employees from independent contractors by
relying on three cases interpreting the muddled 1909 Act.142
2. Actual Control Test
The second test used by the courts following enactment of the
1976 Act was the ―actual control‖ test.143 This was a variation of the
right to control test.144 Under the actual control test, courts did not
just look at whether the hiring party could control or direct the work,
but looked at whether the hiring party actually asserted control over
the creation of the work.145
The leading case on the actual control test is the Second Circuit‘s
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.146 In that case, the plaintiff,
Aldon, was in the business of designing and selling figurines.147 One
of Aldon‘s principals, Arthur Ginsberg, handled the creative aspects
of the company, including product-design.148 In anticipation of a new

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 141 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 140-41; see supra final sentence in Part II.B.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 742; Landau, supra note 66, at 123.
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 549.
Id.
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line of mythological porcelain statuettes, Ginsberg contacted a Japanese firm, Wado, about making models for the porcelain statuettes.149
In addition to describing the pose of the porcelain statuettes and
sending drawings to Wado, Ginsberg traveled to Japan and worked
with the Wado artists to develop the porcelain statuette models.150
Working with the artists included Ginsberg spending ―hours and
hours changing shapes, adjusting attitudes and proportions‖ in addition to giving specific directions to the artists on where to position
the figures‘ heads, legs, and hair.151 Afterwards, Aldon decided to develop brass versions of the statuettes and contacted a Taiwanese
firm, Unibright, about creating brass models that differed from the
porcelain models.152 Ginsberg traveled to Taiwan and worked with
Unibright‘s artists in the same way he worked with Wado‘s artists.153
After Aldon began selling the statuettes, a buyer for Spiegel inspected the statuettes at a trade show and requested a sample.154 Aldon sent
the samples and a few months later discovered Spiegel selling identical
statuettes in its catalogue.155 Aldon sued for copyright infringement and
prevailed at trial, including on the issue of whether the models created
by Wado and Unibright were works made for hire.156
On appeal, Spiegel argued that Wado and Unibright, not Aldon,
were the copyright owners (i.e. the models were not works made for
hire).157 The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the Wado and
Unibright artists were employees working within the scope of their
employment, because ―Ginsberg did much more than communicate a
general concept or idea to the [artists], leaving creation of the expression solely to them.‖158 The court was persuaded by the fact that
―Ginsberg actively supervised and directed the creation‖ of the designs and that although he did not ―physically wield the sketching
pen and sculpting tools, he stood over the artists and artisans at critical stages of the process, telling them exactly what to do.‖159
In adopting the actual control test, the Second Circuit cited to several cases interpreting the 1909 Act and noted that there was
―[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicat[ing] that
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 553.
Id.
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Congress intended to dispense with this prior law . . . .‖160 Rather
than dissecting the legislative history as Professor Hardy has done,
the court concluded that Congress did not intend to narrow what was
meant by ―employee,‖ because there would surely have been some
discussion of this in the legislative history.161 In addition to the Second Circuit, the actual control test was adopted by the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits.162
3. Agency Test
The third test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976
Act was the ―agency‖ test.163 Under this test, courts determined
whether a hired party was an employee or independent contractor by
using the meaning of the word ―employee‖ as understood under agency law.164 Although there was no federal agency law, the courts suggested using the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a guide.165 According to the Restatement, courts consider the following factors in
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors:
(a)

the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;

(b)

whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(c)

the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;

(d)

the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e)

whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work;

(f)

the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g)

the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

160. Id. at 552.
161. Id.
162. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989); see Brunswick
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publ‘g Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987) (―[T]here is no
suggestion that they supervised Beacon employees as they developed the advertisements or
directed the manner of the work‘s completion.‖); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986) (―We find the Second Circuit‘s analysis and conclusion [in Aldon] compelling.‖). But see Landau, supra note 66, at 127 (arguing that although
the Seventh Circuit adopted the actual control test from Aldon, it applied it in a way that
more closely conforms to the right to control test).
163. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739.
164. Easter Seal Soc‘y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enter.,
815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987).
165. Id. at 335.
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(h)

whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;

(i)

whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and

(j)

whether the principal is or is not in business.166

The leading case using the agency test was the Fifth Circuit‘s decision in Easter Seal.167 Easter Seal involved a videotape of a staged
Mardi Gras style parade.168 A representative of the Easter Seal Society entered into a contract with a television station to film the parade
and edit it to be a sixteen-minute segment for the Easter Seal Society‘s telethon.169 The Easter Seal Society representative gave some
suggestions to Mr. Beyer, the head of the film crew, including camera
locations, scenes to look for during the parade, and camera angles.170
However, it was not clear whether Mr. Beyer followed these suggestions.171 In addition, the Easter Seal Society did not control technical
issues, such as lighting, sound, and color balance.172 Mr. Beyer made
all decisions on aesthetics and technical issues concerning the cameras and sound equipment.173
After being aired nationally, the television station permitted a
Canadian television producer to use pieces of the film footage.174 As it
turned out, the Canadian producer used the film in an adult film,
Candy, the Stripper.175 Candy, the Stripper was distributed and
shown nationally by Playboy and others.176 After learning about this,
Easter Seal Society filed suit alleging copyright infringement.177 The
district court held Mr. Beyer was not an employee of the Easter Seal
Society, and therefore, the television station, which did employ Mr.
Beyer, owned the copyright in the film.178
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered three different interpretations of what constituted an employee for work made for hire purposes and analyzed the problems associated with each.179 The Fifth Cir166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
Easter Seal, 815 F.2d 323.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328-34.
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cuit discussed a variation of the right to control test and described
it as ignoring the distinction between employees and independent
contractors.180 Under this test, the courts focus on whether the work
was done at the instance and expense of the hiring party and ask
whether the hiring party had the right to control the work.181 The
Fifth Circuit criticized this test as making the nine categories of
works under § 101(2) ―completely mysterious‖182 and also not deviating from the interpretation of work made for hire under the 1909 Act,
despite a belief that Congress was trying to ―tighten up the ‗work for
hire‘ doctrine under the 1976 Act.‖183
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit was critical of the Second Circuit‘s actual control test in Aldon.184 The Fifth Circuit was concerned that the
actual control test could result in a lack of consistency between the
same buyer and seller if more than one work were produced.185 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit thought the test was overly complicated, because if a formal, salaried employee were hired, but the work was not
actually supervised by the employer, then the employer‘s copyright
would be lost and this ―would be almost unimaginable.‖186 Finally, the
Fifth Circuit criticized the actual control test, because it easily slid
into the right to control test.187
The Fifth Circuit was also critical of the agency test.188 The court
thought that such an interpretation was radically different from the
work made for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act, and the court was
not sure Congress had this in mind.189 Despite these concerns, the
Fifth Circuit adopted the agency test because it: (1) made sense out of
the specially commissioned works categories in § 101(2); (2) tied the
meaning of ―work made for hire‖ to a well-developed doctrine in
agency law; (3) enhanced predictability; and (4) created a ―moral
symmetry‖ with others areas of the law, such as the employer being
liable under the theory of respondeat superior.190

180. Id. at 331.
181. Id. Note that the Fifth Circuit‘s statement of the right to control test focuses on
the right to control the work as opposed to the manner in which the work is performed,
which was set forth in Reeder. See supra Part II.D.1.
182. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 331.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 333-34.
185. Id. at 333.
186. Id. at 334.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 330-31.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 335. Although the other justifications are probably self-evident, with respect
to the fourth justification—moral symmetry—the Fifth Circuit explained ―a buyer is a
statutory ‗author‘ if and only if he is responsible for the negligent acts of the seller. For
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4. Formal, Salaried Employee Test
The final test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976
Act was the ―formal, salaried employee‖ test.191 Under this test,
courts initially looked to see if the hired party ―[held] himself or herself out as a freelancer.‖192 If so, then the hiring party should have
anticipated the work not being a work made for hire.193 If the relationship was ambiguous, then a variety of factors were examined,
most of which were a subset of the factors identified under the agency test.194 These factors included:
(1) whether the [hired party] worked in his or her own studio or on
the premises of the [hiring party]; (2) whether the [hiring party] is
in the regular business of creating works of the type purchased;
(3) whether the [hired party] works for several [hiring parties] at a
time, or exclusively for one; (4) whether the [hiring party] retains
authority to assign additional projects to the [hired party]; (5) the
tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6) whether the
[hired party] is hired through the channels the [hiring party] customarily uses for hiring new employees; (7) whether the [hired
party] is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and
(8) whether the [hired party] obtains from the [hiring party] all
benefits customarily extended to its regular employees.195

Importantly, the formal, salaried employee test does not inquire into
the degree of control and input the hiring party exercises.196
The leading case using the formal, salaried employee test was the
Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Dumas v. Gommerman.197 In Dumas, ITT
Cannon contracted with graphic artist Patrick Nagel to produce four
paintings that ITT would give out as sets of lithographs to ITT Cannon‘s distributors as part of a promotional campaign.198 ITT Cannon‘s
advertising agency determined the content and some parts of the design, borders, and placement of figures and gave Nagel sketches for
him to use in making the illustrations.199 After paying for the paintings and distributing some lithograph sets, ITT Cannon had some
lithographs leftover and eventually sold some to Stefan Gommerman,

example, a buyer will only be the ‗author‘ of a writing if he would be liable under respondeat superior in a defamation action based on that writing.‖ Id.
191. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).
192. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1094.
199. Id.
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an art gallery owner.200 In addition to purchasing the lithographs,
Gommerman purchased ITT Cannon‘s copyrights in the works.201
Nagel‘s widow, Jennifer Dumas, became the successor in interest
in Nagel‘s copyrights.202 After learning about ITT Cannon‘s purported
transfer of the copyrights to Gommerman, Dumas objected to Gommerman‘s reproduction and sales of the paintings, claimed she was
the copyright owner because Nagel was an independent contractor,
and filed suit for copyright infringement.203 Gommerman defended by
arguing that the paintings were works made for hire, because Nagel
was ITT Cannon‘s employee.204 The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Dumas and Gommerman appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.205
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit perused the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act and acknowledged that the final work made for
hire language in the statute was the result of a negotiated compromise.206 The court was reluctant to upset that compromise.207 In analyzing the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
negotiating parties used the term ―employee‖ when referring to ―a salaried worker in a long-term position.‖208 Because ITT Cannon conceded
that Nagel was not a formal, salaried employee, the paintings were not
works made for hire, and the court affirmed the district court.209
The Ninth Circuit recognized that other courts had utilized different tests but criticized those interpretations.210 In particular, the
Ninth Circuit opined that the Second Circuit‘s actual control test
from Aldon failed to recognize that the 1976 Act was trying to substantively change copyright law under the 1909 Act and that it distorted the balance struck in the negotiations between stakeholders.211
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit‘s criticisms of
the actual control and right to control tests.212 And although the
Ninth Circuit largely agreed with the Fifth Circuit‘s agency interpretation in Easter Seal, it did object to the agency test as importing the
actual control or right to control tests and making it difficult to de200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094-95.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1098-1101.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1101 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
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termine, ex ante, whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor.213 Instead, by conceiving of employees under the
formal, salaried employee test, the Ninth Circuit believed there
would be few disputes concerning the status of the hired party.214
E. CCNV v. Reid and the Multifactor Balancing Test
Given the four different approaches to determining whether a
hired party was an employee or independent contractor, it was no
surprise the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit
split. On June 5, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid and
interpreted what Congress meant by the term ―employee‖ in the work
made for hire doctrine under the 1976 Act.215
CCNV was a nonprofit organization committed to eliminating
homelessness.216 In 1985, CCNV hired James Earl Reid to produce a
sculpture for use in a Washington D.C. Christmas pageant.217 Members of CCNV conceived the idea of the sculpture as depicting a lifesize nativity scene, but instead of using the Holy Family, the family
would be homeless people huddled on a steam grate.218 CCNV and
Reid never signed a written agreement nor did they discuss copyright ownership.219
During the course of creating the sculpture, CCNV and Reid communicated several times about the sculpture design, including the
position of the family, the items used to hold the family‘s personal
belongings, and who would serve as models for the family members.220 Reid eventually completed the sculpture and it was displayed
near the pageant site for a month.221 The sculpture was returned to
Reid for minor repairs while CCNV prepared to take the sculpture on
tour.222 Reid objected to taking the sculpture on tour and when CCNV
requested return of the sculpture, Reid refused.223 Both parties
claimed ownership of the copyright, and CCNV filed suit seeking a
declaration of ownership.224
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1105.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The district court, after a two-day bench trial, declared that the
sculpture was a work made for hire.225 In particular, the district court
held that Reid was an employee, because CCNV was the motivating
factor in the production of the work and because CCNV directed
enough of Reid‘s efforts in creating the sculpture CCNV desired.226
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and held the sculpture was not
a work made for hire.227 The D.C. Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit‘s
agency test from Easter Seal and determined that Reid was an independent contractor rather than a CCNV employee.228
The Supreme Court, in explaining the meaning of the work made
for hire language, noted that the 1976 Act does not provide a definition of the term ―employee‖ and that because of this ambiguity, the
four interpretations discussed earlier had emerged.229 Ultimately, the
Court adopted the agency test, because it was ―well established that
‗[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.‘ ‖230 Because, the Court reasoned,
Congress used the term ―employee‖ in conjunction with the term
―scope of employment‖—a widely used term of art in agency law—
and did not use any other language in the statute to indicate that it
meant something other than the common law notion of the relationship between employers and employees, the common law agency test
was appropriate.231
The Court then fleshed out what it meant by the agency test.232
First, it stated that in determining whether a hired party is an employee, ―we consider the hiring party‘s right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished.‖233 Next, citing section 220(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court listed
the following factors as relevant to this inquiry:
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; [3] the location of the work; [4] the duration of the relationship between the parties; [5] whether the hiring party has the
225. Id.
226. Id. at 735-36.
227. Id. at 736.
228. Id. The D.C. Circuit also suggested the possibility that the sculpture could have
been jointly authored by Reid and CCNV in which case both Reid and CCNV would own
the copyright; the court remanded the case to the district court on this basis. Id.; see also
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (describing authors of a joint work as co-owners of the copyright).
229. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39.
230. Id. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
231. Id. at 740.
232. Id. at 751-52.
233. Id. at 751.
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right to assign additional projects to the hired party; [6] the extent
of the hired party‘s discretion over when and how long to work;
[7] the method of payment; [8] the hired party‘s role in hiring and
paying assistants; [9] whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business; [11] the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the tax
treatment of the hired party.234

Although the Court cited the Restatement for the test, it is interesting to note that the factors listed in Reid do not match up exactly to
those factors in the Restatement.235 Besides these oversights, the
Court failed to provide any guidance as to how these factors should
be balanced other than noting that ―[n]o one of these factors is determinative.‖236 The Court then applied these factors to the facts of
the case and held that Reid was an independent contractor, not an
employee, of CCNV, because although CCNV directed Reid‘s work to
the extent it met their specifications, all of the other factors weighed
in favor of Reid being an independent contractor.237
In the course of justifying the common law agency test, the Court
explained that this interpretation furthered ―Congress‘ paramount
goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.‖238 In contrast, the actual control test undermined predictability and certainty, because the parties would not
be able to know until late in the process whether the hiring party had
actually wielded sufficient control over the hired party.239 Because
CCNV had conceded that the closely-related right to control test was
difficult to demonstrate without actual control, the right to control
test suffered from a similar flaw.240
In addition to furthering the policy goals of predictability and certainty, the Court explained that the right to control test focused on
234. Id. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)).
235. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see also
Assaf Jacob, Tort Made For Hire – Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96,
109 (2009). The Court failed to include some of the Restatement factors and added new
factors not listed in the Restatement. Id. For example, the Court introduced the following
factors: ―the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party‘s discretion over when and how long to work; the hired party‘s role in hiring and
paying assistants; and the provision of employee benefits and tax treatment of the hired
party.‖ Id. Likewise, ―the Court omitted the following factors listed in the Restatement:
whether or not the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; and whether or not the
parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant.‖ Id. at 110.
236. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
237. Id. at 752-53.
238. Id. at 749.
239. Id. at 750.
240. Id. at 750 n.17.

2014]

WORK MADE FOR HIRE

221

the relationship between the hiring party and the product, rather
than the relationship between the hiring and hired parties.241 Accordingly, this focus was misguided, because the work made for hire language in section 101 is written in terms of the latter rather than former.242 Moreover, the right to control test ignored the dichotomy between works created by employees and specially commissioned
works, because under the right to control test, a specially commissioned work could also be a work by an employee as long as the hiring party had the right to control the product.243 In short, the right to
control test would largely eliminate the statutory requirement for
specially commissioned works of having a signed writing specifying
the product is a work made for hire.244
Notwithstanding the Court‘s critiques of the right to control test,
the test set forth in Reid seemed to adopt that test as the ultimate
question in the analysis.245 The confusion in the Court rejecting the
right to control test while at the same time partially adopting it is
that the Court explained the right to control test differently than the
way it was originally stated in Reeder. Under Reeder, the court defined the test as ―whether the alleged employer has the right to direct
and supervise the manner in which the [hired party] performs his
work.‖246 This test is nearly identical to the test the Supreme Court
partially adopts in Reid. The right to control test rejected in Reid was
slightly different. The Supreme Court‘s criticisms were aimed at a
test focused on whether ―the hiring party retain[ed] the right to control the product.‖247 The difference between these two versions of the
right to control test is that one focuses on the hiring party controlling
the manner and means of production, whereas the other focuses on
the hiring party controlling the product.248 The cases the Supreme
Court cites to in its discussion of the right to control test framed the
test in terms of the hiring party controlling the manner and means of
production, rather than the product itself,249 but whether this is a
meaningful distinction is doubtful.250
241. Id. at 741.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 741-42.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 751 (―In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished.‖).
246. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
247. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added).
248. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii].
249. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (Colo.
1985) and Reeder, 566 F. Supp. at 142).
250. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii] (―[T]he distinction may
import no different result in many cases.‖).
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The actual control test suffered from a similar problem of failing
to dichotomize. The Court noted that although a work could be a
work made for hire under section 101(2) and not under 101(1) if the
work was specially commissioned, but no actual control was exercised, the Court found there was no support for this distinction in the
statutory language.251 Finally, the Court summarily rejected the formal, salaried employee test, because although there was some support for this approach in the legislative history, the work made for
hire provision used the term ―employee‖ rather than ―formal employee‖ or ―salaried employee.‖252 In addition, the amici arguing for this
approach did not agree on the standard for what constituted a ―formal, salaried employee.‖253
In sum, the Court‘s decision in Reid settled the question that had
plagued the lower courts for several years. And, although the lower
courts now had a multifactor test to help them determine whether
the hired party was an employee or independent contractor, all they
were told about the test was that no single factor was dispositive.
This lack of further guidance led to additional confusion about how
the factors ought to be applied.
F. Weighting Factors—The Aymes v. Bonelli Three-Year Study
Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Reid, the lower courts
were confronted with how the Reid factors were to be applied. According to the Second Circuit, one district court erred in treating all
the Reid factors as equally important and simply tallying the factors
in making its determination.254 To provide the lower courts additional
guidance in applying the Reid factors, the Second Circuit in Aymes v.
Bonelli suggested that ―there are some factors that will be significant
in virtually every situation.‖255 In particular, the Aymes court listed
the following Reid factors as almost always being relevant and deserving of more weight in the multifactor analysis:
(1) the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of
creation;256 (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee
251. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (―[T]here is no statutory support for an additional dichotomy
between commissioned works that are actually controlled and supervised by the hiring
party and those that are not.‖).
252. Id. at 742 n.8. It is worth noting that section 101 also does not use the term employee as understood by the common law of agency.
253. Id.
254. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
255. Id.
256. Read literally, the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of creation is not one of the Reid factors, but it is the ultimate question that the Reid factors help
courts determine. As the Supreme Court stated in Reid, ―[i]n determining whether a hired
party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among
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benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party.257

Of these important factors, the Second Circuit additionally noted
that the employee benefits and tax treatment factors were especially
probative, because ―every case since Reid that . . . applied the
test . . . found the hired party to be an independent contractor where
the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.‖258 In determining which Reid factors were deserving of more
weight, the Aymes court did not simply pull these five factors out of
thin air. Instead it relied on all of the cases decided in the intervening three and a half years since Reid—six cases in total.259
With respect to the remaining Reid factors, the Aymes court indicated that some were generally of little use in the work made for hire
analysis.260 In particular, the court noted that whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in business will generally have little weight in the analysis.261
III. UPDATING AYMES—A COMPREHENSIVE MULTIFACTOR STUDY
The pronouncement of the important factors in Aymes took place a
mere three years after Reid. Since Aymes, many more work made for
hire cases have been decided. Accordingly, a fresh and more comprehensive look at courts‘ analyses of the Reid factors will facilitate a
greater understanding of which factors are the most important in determining whether a hired party is an employee or independent contractor. This study examines the universe of work made for hire cases
since Reid where a determination of the hired party‘s status has been
made and evaluates which factors are and are not important in the
analysis. This part sets forth the methodology for locating and coding
the cases. Next, it describes the results of this study and clusters the
factors based on their importance.

the other factors relevant to this inquiry are [the Reid factors].‖ Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
Nonetheless, many lower courts have treated this as one of the Reid factors. See, e.g., Hi-Tech
Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995); Blair v.
World Tropics Prods., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (W.D. Ark. 2007); Alcatel USA, Inc. v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652-54 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Aerospace Servs. Int‘l v. LPA
Grp. Inc., No. Civ.A.1:90–CV–2605–J, 1992 WL 12000194, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 1992).
257. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
258. Id. at 863.
259. Id. at 860-63.
260. Id. at 863-64.
261. Id. at 863 (―[T]his factor will generally be of little help in this analysis.‖).
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A. Methodology
Using a broad search, I located what I believe to be all of the work
made for hire cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act from June
5, 1989 through June 5, 2014.262 After eliminating false positives,263
this search yielded forty-six work made for hire cases.264 For each
case, the following information was recorded: whether the court concluded the hired party was an employee or independent contractor, the
identity of the court and which circuit it fell within, the year the case
was decided, and whether the case cited Aymes in the context of the
five factors the Aymes court found to almost always be important.265
In addition, for each case two variables were created for each Reid
factor. The first variable was whether the factor favored employee
status, favored independent contractor status, was indeterminate, or
was not addressed by the court. These determinations were made
based on statements by the courts about how these factors affected
the outcome.
The second variable was whether the court weighted each Reid
factor. The coding options for this variable were that the court gave
262. I ran the following search in the ALLCASES database in Westlaw, which contains
all federal and state court cases: employee /p (―work for hire‖ ―work made for hire‖) /p factor!. I then limited the search results to the date range between June 5, 1989 and June 5,
2014. This yielded 109 cases. Of these 109 cases, 43 analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor. I then ran this
search in Lexis: employee /para (―work for hire‖ or ―work made for hire‖) /para factor!. I
then limited the search results to the date range between June 5, 1989 and June 5, 2014.
The Lexis search produced an additional eighteen cases that were not already captured in
the Westlaw search. Only two of these eighteen cases produced a copyright case that analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor. I then ran this search in Bloomberg Law: employee p/ (―work made for
hire‖ OR ―work for hire‖) p/ factor!. I then limited the search results to the date range between June 5, 1989 and June 5, 2014. The Bloomberg search produced an additional five
cases not already captured in the Westlaw and Lexis searches. Only one of these five cases
produced copyright cases that analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired
parties were employees or independent contractors. I recognize that there might be other
work made for hire cases that have been decided, but were not reported in Westlaw, Lexis,
or Bloomberg. See generally Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, passim (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the concept of submerged precedent); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 427-30 (2012) (same). Given the limited
search capabilities of docket management systems, it is cost-prohibitive to do any more of
an exhaustive search.
263. The false positives were mostly non-copyright cases (e.g. Title VII) or copyright
cases where the court did not decide whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor (e.g. denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the analysis).
264. In one case, Huebbe v. Oklahoma Casting Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla.
2009), the District Court engaged in two separate work made for hire analyses. Because
these analyses were distinct, I treated them as two cases. This explains why although
there were forty-five cases in the search, I analyzed forty-six cases as part of this study.
265. Aymes itself was also included in this last variable.
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additional weight to the particular factor, discounted the factor, or
did not expressly weight the factor.266 These too were based on statements (or the absence of statements) by the courts about how much
weight they were giving each of the factors.
In addition to the twelve Reid factors, two factors that were addressed with some frequency were added: (1) the hiring party‘s right
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,267 and (2) how the hired party and hiring party referred to
the hired party. Finally, because the Reid factors are not an exhaustive list, any additional factors the courts discussed in their analyses
were recorded. All of the additional factors were coded the same as
the two variables used for the Reid factors.268
B. Results
Using this data, the following calculations were made: how frequently each factor was addressed by the courts, how consistent each
factor was with the ultimate result about the status of the hired party,
and how frequently each factor was given additional weight or discounted in the courts‘ analyses. These calculations are shown below in
Table 1 as Frequency,269 Consistency,270 Favored Weighting,271 and
Discounted Weighting,272 respectively.

266. The weighting or discounting of the factors could be done either by the court stating that the factor generally was entitled to additional weight or should generally be discounted (i.e. the court stating that in its circuit, the following factors are important) or
during the application of the factor to the facts of the particular case (i.e. the court not
making a pronouncement about the factors‘ importance in the abstract, but stating that a
particular factor was particularly important during the analysis of the facts before it).
267. See supra note 256.
268. My research assistant and I independently coded all of the variables and then met
in person to resolve any conflicts in the coding by reviewing the case.
269. Frequency for each factor is calculated as forty-six total cases minus the number
of cases the factor was not addressed by the courts.
270. Consistency for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of
cases where the factor‘s outcome is consistent with the court‘s ultimate conclusion about
the hired party‘s status. For example, if the skill required factor favors a finding of employee status and the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an employee, then this is
consistent. If, however, the court finds that the skill required factor favors a finding of
employee status, but the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an independent contractor, then this is inconsistent. The percentage in parentheses is calculated by dividing
this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other words, when the factor is
addressed, how consistent is it with the ultimate conclusion?
271. Favored Weighting for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of cases where the factor is given additional weight. The percentage in parentheses is
calculated by dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other
words, when this factor is addressed, how often is it favored?
272. Discounted Weighting for each factor is calculated the same way Favored Weighting
is, but counts cases where the factor is discounted rather than given additional weight.
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These calculations all measure, in some form, the importance of
the factors. The frequency with which a factor is analyzed suggests
whether courts are considering the factor in the first place or simply
ignoring it. A frequently ignored factor is less likely to be important
than one frequently addressed. Likewise, consistency illustrates importance, because a factor that is less reliable in predicting the ultimate outcome suggests that courts treat that factor as having less
impact on the ultimate result than other factors.273 Finally, whether a
factor is discounted or given additional weight in the analysis reflects
its importance as the courts are directly addressing which factors
they take more seriously and find more probative in the analysis and
which factors they routinely declare to be of less importance.
Table 1 – Summary Table
Frequency

Consistency

Favored
Weighting

Discounted
Weighting

Skill required

26 (57%)

22 (85%)

8 (31%)

1 (4%)

Source of
instrumentalities
and tools

33 (72%)

29 (88%)

2 (6%)

1 (3%)

Work location

32 (70%)

24 (75%)

0 (0%)

4 (13%)

Relationship
duration

29 (63%)

23 (79%)

1 (3%)

2 (7%)

Additional projects

29 (63%)

25 (86%)

6 (20%)

1 (3%)

When and how long
to work

32 (70%)

26 (81%)

0 (0%)

2 (6%)

Payment method

39 (85%)

33 (85%)

5 (13%)

0 (0%)

Hiring and paying
assistants

18 (39%)

13 (72%)

0 (0%)

2 (11%)

Part of regular
business of hiring
party

29 (63%)

24 (83%)

0 (0%)

4 (14%)

Factor

Hiring party in
business

9 (20%)

4 (44%)

0 (0%)

3 (33%)

Employee benefits

36 (78%)

32 (89%)

12 (33%)

2 (6%)

Tax treatment

37 (80%)

32 (86%)

12 (32%)

2 (5%)

Right to control
manner and means

36 (78%)

21 (58%)

5 (14%)

4 (11%)

Label

9 (20%)

5 (56%)

1 (11%)

3 (33%)

Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 show how each factor fares with respect to
each of the four calculations. As illustrated in those tables, some factors tend to rise toward the top of the list regardless of which calcula-

273. Inconsistent factors are also less useful to the parties and attorneys in predicting outcomes.
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tion is used.274 Other factors are stable in the middle275 or at the bottom276 of the list. But there is some fluctuation of the factors‘ rankings across calculations.277
Table 2 – Sorted by Frequency (%)
Factor

Frequency

Payment method

39 (85%)

Tax treatment

37 (80%)

Employee benefits

36 (78%)

Right to control manner and means

36 (78%)

Source of instrumentalities and tools

33 (72%)

Work location

32 (70%)

When and how long to work

32 (70%)

Relationship duration

29 (63%)

Additional projects

29 (63%)

Part of regular business of hiring party

29 (63%)

Skill required

26 (57%)

Hiring and paying assistants

18 (39%)

Hiring party in business

9 (20%)

Label

9 (20%)

Table 3 – Sorted by Consistency (%)
Factor

Consistency

Employee benefits

32 (89%)

Source of instrumentalities and tools

29 (88%)

Additional projects

25 (86%)

Tax treatment

32 (86%)

Skill required

22 (85%)

Payment method

33 (85%)

Part of regular business of hiring party

24 (83%)

When and how long to work

26 (81%)

Relationship duration

23 (79%)

Work location

24 (75%)

Hiring and paying assistants

13 (72%)

Right to control manner and means

21 (58%)

Label

5 (56%)

Hiring party in business

4 (44%)

274. For example, payment method, employee benefits, and tax treatment are in the
top half for each calculation.
275. For example, relationship duration is ranked eighth, ninth, ninth, and eighth in
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
276. For example, whether the hiring party is in business is ranked last in every
calculation.
277. For example, payment method is ranked first when sorted by frequency and discounted weighting, but is only sixth for consistency and favored weighting.
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With respect to weighting factors, it is worth noting that other
than giving additional weight to employee benefits, tax treatment,
skill required, and arguably the right to assign additional projects,
courts do very little favorable weighting.278 Discounted weighting is
even rarer. Although the hiring party being in business and the label
used to describe the hired party are discounted thirty-three percent
of the time, in terms of raw numbers, this discounting occurred in
only three cases for each measure.279
Table 4 – Sorted by Favored Weighting (%)
Factor

Favored Weighting

Employee benefits

12 (33%)

Tax treatment

12 (32%)

Skill required

8 (31%)

Additional projects

6 (20%)

Right to control manner and means

5 (14%)

Payment method

5 (13%)

Label

1 (11%)

Source of instrumentalities and tools

2 (6%)

Relationship duration

1 (3%)

Work location

0 (0%)

When and how long to work

0 (0%)

Hiring and paying assistants

0 (0%)

Part of regular business of hiring party

0 (0%)

Hiring party in business

0 (0%)

Table 5 – Sorted by Discounted Weighting (%)
Factor

Discounted
Weighting

Payment method

0 (0%)

Source of instrumentalities and tools

1 (3%)

Additional projects

1 (3%)

Skill required

1 (4%)

Tax treatment

2 (5%)

When and how long to work

2 (6%)

Employee benefits

2 (6%)

Relationship duration

2 (7%)

Hiring and paying assistants

2 (11%)

Right to control manner and means

4 (11%)

Work location

4 (13%)

Part of regular business of hiring party

4 (14%)

Hiring party in business

3 (33%)

Label

3 (33%)

278. See Table 4.
279. See Table 5.
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Although each calculation by itself is helpful in understanding the
importance of a particular factor in the work made for hire analysis,
no single calculation can tell the entire story. For example, if we only
looked at the frequency with which the factors are addressed, then
we might conclude that the skill required is one of the least important of the Reid factors.280 But although frequency tells us how
often the courts address the factor, it could be that, when they do address it, they give it additional weight in the analysis, because the
courts consider it to be important in the inquiry. The skill required
factor falls into this category as it is weighted favorably 31% of the
time. As described earlier, looking only at the weighting calculations
is also of limited use because of the small number of cases where
weight is discussed.281 As a result, all of the calculations must be examined together to discover which factors are the most and least important. Based on all four calculations in Table 1, I propose that the
continuum shown in Figure 1 describes the relative importance of the
work made for hire factors.
Figure 1

This continuum groups together factors that share similar features with respect to each of the calculations. For example, the factors listed as the most important (tax treatment, employee benefits,
and payment method) all have high consistency (85%–89%), are addressed very frequently (78%–85%), are often or sometimes favorably
weighted (13%–33%), and are never or infrequently discounted (0%–
6%). The next group of factors (additional projects, skill required, and
source of the instrumentalities and tools) all have a high consistency
(85%–88%) but have a lower frequency (57%–72%); they do, however,
have significant weighting (6%–31% favorable; 3%–4% discounting).
Because this group is similar in many respects to the ―most im280. Skill required is ranked eleventh in Table 2.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
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portant‖ group, but is addressed with less frequency, these factors
are grouped together and deemed slightly less important.
At the other end of the continuum are the least important factors.
These factors (right to control the manner and means, the label used
to describe the hired party, and whether the hiring party is in business) have very poor consistency (44%–58%). And although the right
to control the manner and means factor is addressed with high frequency (78%), this means very little given how inconsistent it is
(58%) and that courts also split on whether it receives favorable
weighting (14%) or is discounted (11%). The other two factors in this
group are rarely addressed (20%) and are the most likely to be discounted in the analyses (33%).
Whether a particular factor belongs in one group down or one
group up is certainly debatable; reasonable minds can differ. Illustrating the importance of the factors using a continuum with fuzzy
lines separating the groups rather than strict lines of demarcation
between the groups was purposefully chosen to acknowledge this.
To test how useful these groups are at predicting the ultimate outcome in a case, the top three factors were analyzed. If a majority of
the three factors that were addressed favored the ultimate outcome,
this was considered a successful prediction. If only two of the three
factors were addressed and they were split, this was considered an
unsuccessful prediction. Using only the three most important factors
(tax treatment, employee benefits, and payment method), eightyseven percent of the cases would be decided consistent with courts‘
ultimate conclusion. When this study was done using the most important two groups, ninety-one percent of the cases would be decided
consistent with the courts‘ ultimate conclusion. In contrast, doing the
same analysis using the three least important factors yielded a fortyeight percent success rate. Expanding this to the five least important
factors improved the success rate to sixty-three percent. Doing the
same analysis for the middle three factors yielded a seventy-eight
percent success rate. These results are displayed below in Figure 2.
In sum, the structure of this continuum appears to correctly illustrate the relative importance of the Reid and other commonlyconsidered factors.282

282. There are, of course, limitations on this study. The primary limitation is the small
number of cases (n=46) involved in the study. Because of this relatively small number of
cases, it makes it nearly impossible to make the data any more granular. For example, it
might be interesting to see if the factors‘ importance changes based on the type of industry
or work at issue. Although there are some industries or works that occur with some frequency (e.g. architecture and software), there are not enough of these cases to be able to
draw any meaningful conclusions. Another limitation of this study is the potential for selection bias. That is, the parties or their attorneys deciding which case to bring and not
bring based on how the courts addressed the factors in previous decisions. This issue exists
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Figure 2

IV. DISCUSSION
The results of this study lead to two broad questions. First, how do
these results fit within the long and varied developments of the work
made for hire doctrine? Second, going forward, what are the implications of these results? This part explores each of these questions.
With respect to reflecting on the results in light of the historical
developments, this part discusses how these results square with the
Second Circuit‘s statement in Aymes about the importance and lack
of importance of specific factors.283 In addition, it examines whether
and how these results cohere with the pre-Reid interpretations of
―employee‖ and the Supreme Court‘s rationales for adopting and rejecting these interpretations.284
With respect to the implications of these results, this part first
explores how these results may affect general copyright litigation
where the parties contest the work made for hire status of a work.285
Afterwards, these results are situated within the context of the impending litigation concerning the work made for hire status of music
recorded after 1977.286 Finally, this part suggests how these results

with any study based on reported cases, but the effect could be more pronounced in this
situation given the small number of cases.
283. See infra Part IV.A.
284. See infra Part IV.A.
285. See infra Part IV.B.1.
286. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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may be of use to business planning attorneys so they can effectively
advise their clients to achieve their desired results.287
A. Doctrinal Fit
In Aymes, the Second Circuit concluded that the following factors
were the most important in the multifactor analysis:
(1) the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits;
(4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party.288

Of the five Aymes factors, four are within the top two groups of the
continuum.289 The only Aymes factor not in these top two groups is
the hiring party‘s right to control the manner and means of creation.
This factor is surprisingly within the least important group of the
continuum. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Reid suggested
this was not itself a factor but was the ultimate question to be answered using the listed factors.290 Despite this, many lower courts
have deemed the right to control a factor, rather than the ultimate
conclusion.291 The lack of importance of this factor is surprising given
that it is supposed to be determined by the other factors.292 Given
that two courts (the Supreme Court and Second Circuit) have bolstered the importance of this factor, it is worth emphasizing that other courts have, by and large, ignored this authority.
In addition to overemphasizing the importance of the right to control factor, the Aymes court underappreciated the importance of the
method of payment factor. The court acknowledged that this could be
a ―fairly important factor,‖293 but as illustrated above, this factor
turns out to be one of the three most important factors. To a lesser
extent, the source of the instrumentalities was underappreciated by
Aymes, which is within the same group as the skill required factor.
287. See infra Part IV.B.3.
288. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
289. Employee benefits and tax treatment are in the most important group. The skill
required and right to assign additional projects are in the second most important group.
290. See supra note 256.
291. Id.
292. In theory, the lack of importance of the right to control factor could make sense
given the way the Supreme Court and Restatement (Second) of Agency have phrased the
test as the ultimate question. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
750-51 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§220, 228 cmt. c (1958). In other
words, if the lower courts interpreted Reid this way, then it would not be an important
factor, because it is not really a factor at all. However, this explanation is not warranted
given that the lower courts have frequently treated the right to control as a factor (seventyeight percent frequency). See supra Table 1. Ultimately, this factor is not consistent with
the outcomes and is treated inconsistently by the courts with respect to the weighting.
293. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
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In addition to declaring which factors were the most important,
the Aymes court also opined that whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in
business were of little use in the analysis.294 Based on the results of
this study, it turns out that Aymes was certainly correct with respect
to whether the hiring party is in business, because this factor is in
the least important group. However, being part of the regular business of the hiring party is not as inconsequential as Aymes made it
out to be. Although not one of the most important factors, this factor
is in the middle of the pack.
In sum, the statements in Aymes about the importance or lack of
importance of specific factors are largely, but not completely, consistent with the results of this study. Of course, this could be attributed to path dependency. That is, the courts were bound to follow
or were heavily influenced by Aymes. Of the forty-six cases, thirty-six
postdated Aymes. Of those thirty-six cases, eight (twenty-two percent) cite to Aymes, or a case citing Aymes, for the proposition that
the Aymes factors are the important ones.295 Although path dependency probably had some influence on the ultimate outcome of the importance of the factors, the variations between the results of this
study and the conclusions in Aymes suggest that path dependency
was not dispositive in determining importance.
With respect to the results of this study as they relate to the preReid tests for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, two observations are in order. First, as described earlier, although the Supreme Court cast the rejected right to control test as
focusing on controlling the product as opposed to controlling the
manner and means of production,296 it is questionable whether there
is a meaningful difference between them.297 Nonetheless, the right to
control test, as adopted by the lower courts before Reid, focused on
the right to control the manner and means in which the hired party
worked.298 Even assuming the Supreme Court had correctly understood the right to control test, the results of this study suggest that
the right to control is unimportant. This factor is in the least important group on the continuum. As a result, the Supreme Court‘s
rejection of the right to control test is consistent with the results of
this study. However, because the Supreme Court misunderstood the

294. Id.
295. Of course, courts that reached a similar conclusion with respect to how they balanced the factors could have read Aymes but failed to cite to the opinion.
296. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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test, the reason for the consistency has little to do with the Court‘s
rationale for rejecting the test.299
Second, when comparing the formal, salaried employee test with
the results of this study, we see that the Dumas factors tend to line
up fairly-well with the most important factors on the continuum. Of
the eight Dumas factors, six are also found in Reid.300 Like Aymes,
the Dumas factors account for four of the top six factors. But unlike
Aymes, the Dumas factors account for all three of the most important
factors. The other two Dumas factors that are found in Reid—
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party
and location of the work—fall in the middle or lower end of the continuum, but not the lowest group as occurred with the Aymes factors.
Moreover, one of the Dumas factors not listed in Reid—working for
several hiring parties or exclusively for one—was addressed in four
cases as an additional factor. This was the most common ―other‖ factor and although not weighted favorably or discounted, it was 100%
consistent with the ultimate outcomes in the cases. Given these results, it may be that courts are actually using a variation of the Dumas formal, salaried employee test. This comports with Professor
Hardy‘s view that the formal, salaried employee test is the appropriate one.301 Recall that Professor Hardy argued that the stakeholders
assumed this was the test when they negotiated the terms of the
1976 Act in light of the 1909 Act, which seemed to recognize hiring
party ownership of works created by salaried employees.302 The factors at the important end of the continuum support the view that a
variation of the formal, salaried employee test is what the courts are
actually using in arriving at their conclusions. This is an interesting
result in light of how harshly the Supreme Court treated the formal,
salaried employee test in Reid.303 The importance of these factors also

299. Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006, defines employee as ―an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and
means of the agent‘s performance of work.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07
(2006). The factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency have been relegated to the
comments of section 7.07. Id. at § 7.07 cmt. f. No court has suggested reviving the right to
control test in light of this change in the Restatement.
300. These factors include: (1) whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio
or on the premises of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular business of creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hiring party retains authority
to assign additional projects to the hired party; (4) the tax treatment of the relationship by
the parties; (5) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and
(6) whether the hired party obtains from the hiring party all benefits customarily extended to
its regular employees. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
301. See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text.
303. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8 (noting that the statutory definition of work made
for hire ―cannot support‖ the formal, salaried employee test, and acknowledging disagreement about the exact contours of the test). This test was rejected in a footnote, unlike the
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brings us back full circle to the legislative history of the 1909 Act,
which focused on employees being salaried.304
One reason courts gravitate towards the three factors at the important end of the continuum could be that they are objectively
measured and easy to apply. For example, whether the hiring party
treated the hired party as an employee or independent contractor for
tax purposes only involves looking at payroll documents and forms
filed with the federal government. Likewise, providing benefits such as
insurance is easily verified by looking at enrollment data. Similarly,
the method of payment is easily determined by looking at paystubs to
figure out the frequency and amounts paid. This is not to say that the
other factors cannot be easily proven by looking at documents or other
evidence, but factors such as skill required or the right to control the
manner and means involve a certain level of subjectivity.
One final note about Reid and the results of this study is apposite.
In justifying the agency test, the Supreme Court explained that
―Congress‘ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act [was] enhancing
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.‖305 Given the results of this study and the multitude of cases where summary judgment is denied because of an issue of material fact about whether the
hiring party is an employee or independent contractor, it is doubtful
that the agency test has achieved this result.306 Under Reid, courts
balance about a dozen factors, some of which are consistent with the
ultimate conclusion and some of which have very little to do with the
ultimate result. It is odd to imagine a multifactor balancing test such
as the one set forth in Reid as providing more predictability and certainty to the parties than a smaller set of factors would achieve.307 If
enhancing certainty and predictability of copyright ownership really
were Congress‘ paramount goals in the 1976 Act, then perhaps the
right to control and actual control tests, which were rejected in the main text of the
opinion. Id.
304. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
305. Reid, 490 U.S. at 749.
306. See, e.g., Int‘l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat‘l Fire Prot. Ass‘n, No. 02C5610, 2006 WL
850879, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2006) (summary judgment is precluded because ―a reasonable trier of facts could resolve the Reid multifactor analysis in either party‘s favor‖);
Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (―In light of these and other
disputed questions of material fact, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law whether
plaintiff‘s songs constitute works-for-hire or to whom the copyright in these songs belongs.‖); Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (―Having examined the Reid–Aymes factors and drawn all inferences in
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that either the musical
composition or the sound recording of the Vocal Phrase were created as works for hire.‖).
307. In the consumer context, we see that having too much choice or too many options
can lead to bad results. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE – WHY
MORE IS LESS passim (2004). Perhaps courts suffer from a similar version of analysis paralysis in that they either fail to resolve the issue themselves, and instead let juries decide,
or latch onto a subset of factors and fail to engage in a complete multifactor analysis.
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Supreme Court should reconsider the Reid test and adopt a subset of
factors for the courts to consider. One option would be to only use the
factors in the most important and second most important groups of
the continuum. Another option would be to use the factors from the
top two groups, but if those factors are evenly split, then turn to the
less important factors as tie-breakers. In the event Congress has the
opportunity to revisit the work made for hire doctrine and believes
predictability and certainty are still valuable goals vis à vis copyright
ownership, then perhaps Congress could provide more guidance as to
what constitutes an employer-employee relationship by recognizing
these factors as existing in tiers. Neither is likely, but given the lack
of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to balance the factors,
lower courts have the flexibility to adopt a formal recognition of the
important and unimportant factors as suggested by the continuum
presented here.
B. Practical Implications
Although the fit between the results of this study and the underlying doctrine and historical developments is intriguing, these results
may also be of great value to litigators and business planning attorneys in the field. Where the parties dispute the work made for hire
status of a copyright, these results will help litigators to gather and
present evidence concerning the doctrine and to better evaluate their
cases.308 One such instance, explored in more depth below, is the upcoming litigation between artists, producers, and record companies in
regard to songs recorded after 1977.309 In the context of business
planning, these results will help attorneys structure their clients‘ relationships to help achieve the desired employment status.310 Each is
discussed in detail below.
1. General Work Made for Hire Litigation
Litigation involving employment status under the work made for
hire doctrine can arise in a few situations. For example, a defendant
may assert that the plaintiff has no right to assert a claim for copyright infringement, because the plaintiff is not the legal or beneficial
owner of the copyright as a result of the work being a work made for
hire.311 Another example is a copyright infringement dispute between
the hiring and hired parties where the alleged infringer successfully
defends by claiming ownership of the copyright via the work made for
308. See infra Part IV.B.1.
309. See infra Part IV.B.2.
310. See infra Part IV.B.3.
311. Only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to institute an
action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
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hire doctrine.312 Another instance could be determining whether artists are entitled to assert violations of their moral rights under the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which does not provide moral
rights to works made for hire.313 Finally, the employment status in
the work made for hire doctrine may arise in situations involving
terminations of transfers, which also do not apply to works made for
hire.314 In these situations, determining whether a party is an employee or independent contractor may entirely or partially dispose of
a case or significantly shift negotiating power when trying to settle a
dispute.
Armed with the results of this study, litigators engaged in discovery can focus their energy and clients‘ money on the factors at the
most important end of the continuum and pay less attention to those
at the least important end. After completing discovery, the attorneys
can use the continuum to decide how to present their arguments in
favor of and against a work made for hire conclusion. For example, in
a motion for summary judgment, rather than simply analyzing the
factors in the order presented in Reid, it may be more persuasive to
analyze the factors in the order of importance. If most of the factors
at the important end of the continuum support the movant, then presenting them this way may cause the judge to grant the motion.315
Likewise, if the factors at the more important end are split, the nonmovant may want to present the factors like this to avoid summary
judgment. In addition to gathering and presenting evidence of employment status, these results should assist attorneys in evaluating
their clients‘ cases and giving more informed recommendations about
whether to settle a dispute and for how much.316 In short, focusing on
312. See, e.g., Maness v. Heavrin, 97 F.3d 1457, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision). The reason this situation arises is because one cannot infringe a copyright they
own. Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1965) (―[A] copyright owner cannot
infringe against his own copyright.‖).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (defining ―work of visual art‖ as not including a work made
for hire).
314. Id. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, [certain
granted rights are] subject to termination . . . .‖). For a more detailed analysis on termination rights, see infra Part IV.B.2.
315. This is not to say that simply reordering the factors will cause a change in outcome in most cases. In fact, considering how to present the factors may only be useful in
borderline cases where a court is on the fence about granting or denying a motion for
summary judgment.
316. It is unclear if the parties would settle even if they knew this information. Looking
at the 46 cases involved in this study, in 22 (48%) of them, 100% of the factors that were
addressed and not indeterminate were consistent with the ultimate outcome in the case
(e.g. if 9 factors were addressed, the court held all nine weighed in favor of the outcome). In
10 of the cases (22% of the total), only one factor was inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion. Combined, 70% of the cases involved a situation where 0 or 1 factor was inconsistent
with the ultimate outcome. Once the attorneys in these cases knew what the facts were, it
is hard to understand why the attorneys for the eventually-losing parties would push
ahead with this aspect of the litigation.
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the most important factors can provide the increased predictability
and certainty that the Court in Reid thought it was providing.
2. Specific Work Made for Hire Litigation—Terminations of
Transfers and Sound Recordings
One of the most interesting areas of copyright law where the work
made for hire status will arise is with respect to terminations of
transfers in sound recordings. Section 203 of the Copyright Act permits termination right owners to end certain post-1977 transfers of a
copyright and reclaim the copyright for themselves.317 That is, if the
work and type of transfer are eligible for termination and the termination right is exercised, all the rights covered by the transfer revert
back to the owner of the termination interest.318 As a result, the termination right holder gets ―a second bite at the apple‖ and can attempt to
negotiate a new license or assignment on more favorable terms.319
For example, imagine an unknown artist records a song at her
home studio and in 2014 successfully sells her copyright in the sound
recording to a record company for a measly sum. The recording turns
out to be a huge success, and the record company earns millions of
dollars from exploiting its acquired rights in the recording. Under
section 203, after thirty-five years, the recording artist could reclaim
the copyright in the sound recording. If the record company wanted
to continue exploiting the recording, it would be forced to sit down at
the negotiating table with the recording artist and reach a new deal.
Presumably, the recording artist will negotiate a better deal in 2049
than she did in 2014.
As illustrated by this example, the termination of transfer right is
a powerful one. As it turns out, 2013 was the first year of terminations under section 203320 and a wave of termination disputes is expected over the next several years.321 These disputes (and the inevi317. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
318. Id. § 203(b).
319. Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie
Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works Made For Hire, 48 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC‘Y U.S.A. 145, 155 (2000). Sections 304(c) and (d) of the Copyright Act are additional
termination of transfers provisions, but apply to copyrights transferred before 1978. 17
U.S.C. § 304(c), (d). Like section 203, these sections also exclude works made for hire from
termination. But because the works were created before 1978, the 1909 Copyright Act‘s
work made for hire doctrine applies rather than the modern doctrine.
320. Section 203 applies to transfers made on or after January 1, 1978. § 203(a). The fiveyear termination window begins thirty-five years after execution of the transfer. Therefore,
the earliest five-year window could have begun on January 1, 2013. See § 203(a)(3).
321. See Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future
of Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 71 (2011); William Henslee & Elizabeth
Henslee, You Don’t Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should Not Be Applied to Sound Recordings, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 695, 704 (2011).
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table litigation accompanying them) will turn, in part, on the outcome of the work made for hire analysis and what it means to be an
employee versus an independent contractor, because termination of
transfer rights do not exist for works made for hire.322 Instead, an
employer whose employee created a copyrightable work will be the
author and can enjoy the copyright for the duration without the fear
of losing the copyright thirty-five to forty years later. To be sure,
terminations of transfers under section 203 apply to all types of copyrightable works. But the looming litigation involving terminations of
transfers of sound recordings is a good case study for analyzing how
the Reid factors should be analyzed and what the likely outcome is in
light of the factors‘ relative importance.
To appreciate the work made for hire analysis of sound recordings,
it is necessary to understand what sound recordings are and the potential authors laying claim to those copyrights. Sound recordings
are ―works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken,
or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are embodied.‖323 Sound recordings are to be
distinguished from musical works, which are the underlying composition and lyrics.324 An artist who sings and records a song written by
someone else has created a copyrightable sound recording but has no
copyright interest in the underlying composition.325
There are three major players in the sound recording industry
who are likely to make a claim as being an author of a particular
sound recording. First are the recording artists themselves. The artists are the individuals in the recording studio and creating the
sounds by playing the instruments and singing the lyrics. Artists
could be solo artists such as Billy Joel and Madonna or groups like
Aerosmith and Bon Jovi. The House Report accompanying the Sound
Recording Act of 1971326 suggests that recording artists can be authors of sound recordings.327 The Copyright Office does the same.328

322. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (―In the case of any work other than a work made for hire,
[a transfer of rights] is subject to termination . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).
323. Id. § 101 (defining ―sound recordings‖).
324. See Jessica L. Bagdanov, Comment, Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for Greater Equity in the Copyright Royalty Payment Structure, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 139 (2010).
325. See Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound Recording Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2009).
326. The legislation in the Sound Recording Act of 1971 gave federal copyright protection to sound recordings. Before then, the only protection afforded was state common law
copyright protection. Daniel Gould, Time’s Up: Copyright Termination, Work-For-Hire and
the Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 97-98 (2007).
327. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1569.
328. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56, Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings 1 (2014), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf.
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Second are the producers. Producers come in all forms, but many
of the most successful are those who are the driving force behind the
recording; they are the ones with a vision of the recording and orchestrate everything from the lead vocals to instrumental solos to
background vocals.329 Producers bring their experience with songwriting and arranging, musical performance, and recording to the table
along with their musical philosophy, knowledge of the music business, and rapport with artists to create the sound eventually heard
by the public.330 Just as with recording artists, the House Report and
Copyright Office suggest that producers may have a claim to authorship of sound recordings.331
Third are the record companies. The role of the record company
has changed over time. Initially, the record companies exercised a
great deal of control over the creative process.332 But beginning in the
1970s, record companies narrowed their focus to manufacturing and
promoting the sale of records.333 Nonetheless, record companies have
not really abdicated all control over the creation of sound recordings334 and have a strong interest in claiming these recordings as
works made for hire.335 In fact, nearly all recording contracts between
record companies, artists, and producers contain clauses stating that
the sound recordings are works made for hire and are owned by the
record companies.336 Unfortunately for the record companies, merely
329. RICHARD JAMES BURGESS, THE ART OF MUSIC PRODUCTION 60-61 (Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2013) (describing how producers ―can influence the intuitiveness of the
arrangement so it flows naturally, is appealing on a first listen, creates a desire to be heard
again, and holds the listener‘s interest through repeated plays‖); M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY
& SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 37 (Billboard Books 8th ed. 2000).
330. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Defusing Copyright‘s Termination of Transfers
Time Bomb 1 n.4 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Gould,
supra note 326, at 112-13 (describing the role of the producer); see generally RICHARD
BUSKIN, INSIDE TRACKS: A FIRST-HAND HISTORY OF POPULAR MUSIC FROM THE WORLD‘S
GREATEST RECORD PRODUCERS AND ENGINEERS passim (1999) (providing interviews with
several successful record producers).
331. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570;
CIRCULAR 56, supra note 328, at 1.
332. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 1 (noting that before the 1960s, the A&R
departments at the record companies ―nurtured the talent by locating, writing, and arranging music, recruiting studio musicians, and arranging recording sessions, often in labelowned or affiliated studios‖).
333. REEBEE GAROFALO, ROCKIN‘ OUT: POPULAR MUSIC IN THE USA 220 (Prentice Hall
4th ed. 2008); Day, supra note 321, at 74-75 (describing record companies subsidizing music video production, providing support for promotional tours, and incurring the promotional, manufacturing, and distribution costs).
334. See infra notes 401-14 and accompanying text.
335. Henslee & Henslee, supra note 321, at 697 (―Record companies prefer for sound
recordings to be considered under the ‗work-made-for-hire‘ doctrine because it prevents this
right of termination and recapture.‖).
336. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, THE MUSICIAN‘S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 390 (Mark
Halloran ed., rev. 2d ed. 1996); KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 28, 72;
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declaring a work to be a work made for hire does not necessarily
make it so.337 This is because such statements are only relevant for
specially commissioned works made for hire, not those falling under
the employee within the scope of employment provision.338
As a result, an analysis of the Reid factors is necessary to determine whether artists and producers are employees of the record companies or independent contractors and hence whether the sound recordings are works made for hire.339 The remainder of this part analyzes the Reid factors in light of common practices in the music business. Then, using the continuum of importance, this part determines
whether artists and producers are likely to be deemed employees and
provides an in-depth roadmap for litigants and judges to analyze this
issue in the upcoming cases. That being said, a word of caution is in
order. Like with most general rules, there are exceptions. Contracts
and practices in the record industry are no different. Every recording
contract is not the same and what may be a general practice might
not apply in a particular case.
(a) Group #1
Starting with the most important group of factors, the first factor
to consider is the tax treatment. This factor likely weighs in favor of
RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER‘S VIEW 150
(2005); Henslee & Henslee, supra note 321, at 697.
337. Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again – Determining Authorship in
a Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 139, 151 (2006).
338. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining work made for hire).
339. This article does not address whether the sound recordings could be a work made
for hire under section 101(2) of the definition, which provides this status to specially ordered or commissioned works falling into one of nine categories. This analysis has been
done by several others and is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to work
made for hire under section 101(1). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75,
at § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (concluding that ―there is no armchair answer‖ to this question); Field,
supra note 319, at 174-75 (noting that most scholars having indicated that sound recordings are not collective works or compilations); Gould, supra note 326, at 127-29 (concluding
that sound recordings are ―poor candidate[s]‖ for collective works, but could satisfy the
requirement if an album included many guest artists or consisted of a compilation of an
artist‘s hits); Jaffe, supra note 337, at 166-69 (2006) (concluding that Congress likely ―did
not intend for sound recordings to constitute a collective work[,]‖ but there is merit to the
contrary argument); David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works For Hire,
and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 387 (2001)
(noting that it is ―rank speculation‖ that sound recordings routinely qualify as contributions to collective works and that the matter will remain in doubt until ―painstaking analysis is performed‖). It is worth mentioning however that in 1999, Congress
ed § 101(2) to add sound recordings to the list of categories eligible for work made for hire
status. This was done at the insistence of the Recording Industry Association of American
and rushed through Congress as a ―technical amendment‖ to the Omnibus Communications Reform Act of 1999 without analysis or debate. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002). Outrage ensued
and Congress, with its tail between its legs, repealed the amendment in Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000. Id. at 375-76.
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artists and producers, because record companies ―rarely withhold income taxes or contribute to social security . . . .‖340
The second factor is whether employee benefits are provided. This
factor is a tossup with respect to artists, but it definitely weighs in
favor of producers. As a general rule, record companies do not provide
health insurance, dental insurance, or retirement funds.341 Nonetheless, the two major artist unions—AFTRA and AFM—provide health
and retirement funds for their members.342 Although not directly
providing these traditional benefits, record companies are required to
contribute to these unions‘ health and retirement funds as part of
their agreements with the unions.343 As a result, although not directly paying for employee benefits, the record companies are indirectly
providing them to those who qualify. Similar agreements for the
funding and provision of benefits do not exist for producers.344 In sum,
record companies have a colorable argument that they provide benefits
to artists, but not for producers. This factor could go either way with
respect to artists, but it certainly weighs in favor of producers.
The last factor in this group is the method of payment. Although
record companies have a little room to argue this factor weighs in
their favor, it overwhelmingly favors artists and producers being
treated as independent contractors. Artists and producers are compensated identically in two ways—advances and royalties. Artists are
also compensated in a way producers are not—union scale.345 Artists
and producers receive advances as part of a recording fund or are
given separate cash advances that are not tied to the recording
fund.346 Under a recording fund arrangement, the artist or producer
340. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
341. BRIAN MCPHERSON, GET IT IN WRITING: THE MUSICIAN‘S GUIDE TO THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 91 (1999).
342. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 64 (―The AFTRA Health and Retirement Funds provide medical coverage and retirement benefits for eligible AFTRA members.‖); MCPHERSON, supra note 341; see BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 229;
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 5.
343. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 60, 64.
344. E-mail from Jeff Slattery, Assistant Professor of Law and Arts & Entertainment
Law Project Director at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, to author (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:25
PM EST) (on file with author) (confirming that no producers‘ union exists that provides
similar benefits to authors and that agreements between producers and record companies
do not provide for such employee benefits). Professor Slattery also notes that many artists
do not receive health and retirement benefits under their agreements with labels, union
membership, or otherwise and thus are similarly situated as producers. E-mail from Jeff
Slattery, Assistant Professor of Law and Arts & Entertainment Law Project Director at
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, to author (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:24 PM EST) (on file with author).
345. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 5 (―Throughout the post 1978 period, artists
have traditionally been paid through advances against future royalties, although studio
recording time may be credited at union scale.‖).
346. BURGESS, supra 329, at 171; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203;
MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 61.
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pays for the recording costs and if any money remains at the close of
production, the artist or producer keeps the rest.347 Any advances or
recording funds are paid in installments with a percentage paid before commencement of the recording, and the remainder of the payments are paid at various benchmarks along the way and upon delivery and acceptance of the masters.348 Compensation via an advance
suggests that artist and producers are independent contractors, as
payment by the job, instead of by the hour, is indicative of an independent contractor relationship.349
Artists and producers are also paid a royalty based on sales of the
album.350 These royalties are not paid to the artist and producer until
the record company has recouped its recording costs, including any
advances paid to the artist and producer.351 Once recouped, record
companies generally pay artists‘ and producers‘ royalties twice a
year, although some do so quarterly and others annually.352 Like with
advances, the payment of royalties is not like an hourly wage or fixed
salary paid to employees at frequent intervals. The payments cover a
several-month period and the amount varies depending on the success of the album. As a result, this method of payment also favors
artists and producers being classified as independent contractors.
Finally, artists may be compensated at union scale.353 For singers,
as opposed to musicians, AFTRA provides minimum rates that artists must be compensated at, even if the artists are entitled to royalties.354 Union scale under AFTRA is calculated as the greater of a perhour amount or per-side (per song) amount.355 However, it should be
noted that these payments are capped at three times the minimum
scale per side.356 With respect to payment of artists at union scale as
calculated by the hour, this method of payment looks more akin to an
hourly-wage arrangement for an employee.357 Nonetheless, the fact
that record companies pay this amount at all has more to do with
their agreement with the union rather than the relationship to the
347. MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 61; SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 108.
348. See BURGESS, supra 329, at 171; SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 211-12.
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958).
350. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 39-40 (producers); id. at 203 (―[Recording artists] rely on royalty compensation, which is contingent on success.‖).
351. Id. at 23 (―Artists generally do not receive any royalties until the record company
has recovered all of its recording costs incurred for the artist‘s records.‖).
352. SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 121.
353. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 5.
354. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 230.
355. Id.; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 17 (―A side customarily consists of
a single composition with a minimum duration of 2 ½ minutes.‖).
356. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 230.
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958).
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artist, which undercuts the force of this argument.358 But if payments
are calculated by the per-side method, they appear to be payments by
the job and artists are likely to be deemed independent contractors.359
In sum, the method of payment factor overwhelmingly favors artists
and producers being treated as independent contractors.
(b) Group #2
Moving on to the second most important group of factors, the first
factor to consider is whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party. This factor probably favors artists being treated as employees, but producers as independent contractors. Most recording contracts are structured so the artist is required to create one album, but the record company is also given a
series of options to extend the agreement for several more albums.360
The number of options the record company has depends on the bargaining power of the artist but five or six options are common.361 Unlike artists, agreements between producers and record companies do
not give the record company options to require the producer to produce another album.362
The second factor in this group is the skill required. This factor
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers being independent contractors. The record companies expend a tremendous amount of energy trying to find which artists to sign and which to pass on.363 Not
every artist can fill the void in the market the record company is
looking to capture and performing that sound can be quite a unique
skill.364 The record companies seem to acknowledge this unique skill
when they include provisions in the recording contracts that the artists are of a special and unique character that gives them peculiar

358. This same argument could undercut record companies‘ positions with respect to
artists‘ benefits, which is already an uncertain proposition. See supra notes 341-44 and
accompanying text.
359. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958).
360. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203 (―Many recording contracts call
for additional recordings at the option of the record company.‖).
361. MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 59.
362. See BURGESS, supra note 329, at 168 (―Producer contracts rarely extend beyond
one album . . . .‖); SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 210-11 (describing how producers may
be given a right to produce subsequent albums if a certain number of copies are sold).
363. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 322-23; see also PETER MULLER,
THE MUSIC BUSINESS – A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: MUSIC AND LIVE PERFORMANCES 79 (Quorum Books 1994) (describing what A&R departments do); SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at
21 (describing the major function of A&R departments at record companies as discovering
new talent); ALAN H. SIEGEL, BREAKIN‘ IN TO THE MUSIC BUSINESS 25, 91-92 (Cherry Lane
Books 1986) (illustrating enormous amount of time and energy A&R departments spend
trying to find good artists).
364. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
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value.365 Although drafted to allow record companies to obtain injunctive relief if artists try to record for other record companies during
their contracts, these provisions may likely be used to hoist the record companies by their own petards. For producers, creating a sound
recording is a highly-skilled job in that the producer not only needs to
have a grand vision for what the album or record will sound like but
also frequently makes musical suggestions to achieve that sound.366
As with artists, the contracts between record companies and producers contain clauses providing that the producers and their skills are
special and unique.367
The final factor in this group looks at the source of the instrumentalities and tools. This factor likely favors artists and producers or is
neutral. Although record companies sometimes own their own recording studios, it is rare that artists actually record there.368 If the recording is done at an independent studio, this factor would be neutral. However, sometimes the producer or even the artist owns the
recording studio and equipment.369 In such a case, this factor could
weigh in favor of the artists or producer being an independent contractor. As far as providing the instruments used during the recording sessions, these are normally owned by the artists and are sometimes purchased or paid off using the advance received from the record company.370
(c) Group #3
The third group of factors along the continuum of importance also
has three factors. The first factor in this group is the extent of the
hired party‘s discretion over when and how long to work. Who this
factor benefits may very well depend on the stature of the artist or
producer. Brand new artists and producers are given little control over

365. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 358.
366. See BURGESS, supra note 329, at 27, 182 (―Like all artistic endeavors, the successful pursuit of music production requires the development of practical skills.‖ Creating hit
singles and albums ―requires skill and experience.‖); GAROFALO, supra note 333, at 223
(―Overdubbing, layering, mixing, and the addition of special effects such as reverb, equalization, and compression removed increasingly important aspects of the creative process
from the studio performance and located them in the control room, elevating the producer
to an artistic status equal to that of the musicians he produced.‖).
367. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 397-98.
368. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
369. Nimmer & Menell, supra note 339, at 399 (referring to testimony by Sheryl Crow
that she owns her own recording equipment).
370. DICK WEISSMAN, THE MUSIC BUSINESS 56 (Crown Publishers, Inc. 1990).
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issues such as the time for recording.371 But over time, artists and producers can secure control over this aspect of their recordings.372
The second factor in this group is whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party. This factor certainly favors the
record companies.373 Record companies are, and always have been,
in the business of creating or acquiring rights to sound recordings
and having those recordings distributed.374 Recording the albums
that will eventually be distributed falls perfectly in line with these
business practices.
The final factor in this group is the duration of the relationship
between the parties. Artists and producers will probably be treated
differently with respect to this factor. As mentioned earlier, recording
contracts with artists are typically for a certain number of albums,
and the record company has several options to extend the relationship.375 As a result, the exact duration of the relationship can be difficult to determine,376 but typically lasts for a period of several years,377
although usually not more than five to seven years.378 These long durations weigh in favor of artists being deemed employees.

371. See SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 111 (―In the basic beginner situation, the record
company quite understandably seeks to maintain as much control as possible. Their experience has shown them that too often when they have relinquished control, disaster results); BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 331 (sample recording contract stating
―The masters recorded hereunder by Artist shall be recorded in a recording studio selected
or approved by Company at such times as Company may designate or approve.‖); id. at 340
(another sample recording contract providing that the artist‘s recording budget must include ―the dates of recording and mixing . . .‖ and that the artist may begin recording after
the record company has given its written approval).
372. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203 (―A record company‘s control is
likely limited to choosing producers and material to record.‖); SIEGEL, supra note 363, at
121-23.
373. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
374. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1369 (3d ed. Aspen Pub. 2002)
(record companies typically own the rights to sound recordings); NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASS‘N, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 29 (Howard Siegel ed., 3d ed. 2004) (―Typically, the record
company acquires all right, title and interest in and to the masters . . . .‖); SCHULENBERG,
supra note 336, at 149 (―[W]ithout the rights [to the sound recordings], the record company
has nothing . . . .‖); see DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 65-66, 68 (8th ed. 2012) (describing distribution by major and independent record companies).
375. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 14 (―The standard contract runs
for a term based on the delivery of a minimum number of recordings (usually enough to
constitute one album) plus a period of time thereafter (usually 9 months). The record company may have an option to extend the agreement for one or more successive albums.‖);
supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
376. SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 105.
377. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
378. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 223 (describing that the AFM bylaws do not allow musicians to enter into personal service contracts for more than five
years without approval); SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 28 (―In general, the total con-
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Producers, on the other hand, are not typically signed to agreements
giving the record companies options to have producers work on subsequent albums. Instead, a producer‘s working relationship with the record company is based upon the success of earlier recordings.379 Producers are almost always hired on a project basis rather than a number of
years.380 In fact, sometimes producers are hired to work on a single song
rather than an entire album.381 As a result, the duration factor weighs
in favor of producers being treated as independent contractors.
(d) Group #4
Moving on to the less important end of the continuum, there are
two factors to consider. The first factor is the location of the work.
This factor likely weighs in favor of artists and producers as independent contractors. Although record companies may have their own
in-house studios382 and prefer that they be used,383 it is rare for artists
to record at those studios.384 Instead, the record companies try to include a provision in their contracts giving the record company the right
of final approval of the recording studio.385 In practice, the record companies will approve any legitimate studio.386 Given that very few recordings occur at the record companies‘ studios, that the choice of the
recording studio is made by artists and producers,387 and that the record companies rarely exercise their ability to veto a location, this factor
probably favors artists and producers as independent contractors.
The second factor in this group is the hired party‘s role in hiring
and paying assistants. This factor probably weighs in favor of artists
and, to a lesser extent, producers being independent contractors, but
may depend on the use of a recording fund and recoupment. In terms
of selecting those who contribute to the recording, the artists and
producers typically choose which engineers, non-featured musicians,

tract period will not run more than 7 years. This 7-year restriction can be directly traced to
a provision of the California Labor Code, Section 2855 . . . .‖).
379. SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 210.
380. Id.
381. BURGESS, supra note 329, at 168; SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 210.
382. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 1.
383. WEISSMAN, supra note 370, at 48.
384. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
385. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 331 (―The masters recorded hereunder by Artist shall be recorded in a recording studio selected or approved by Company at
such times as Company may designate or approve.‖); MULLER, supra note 363, at 82.
386. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332 (―Generally, the record company
will approve any recording studio the artist or the artist‘s producer wishes to use, so long
as it has satisfactory recording equipment and the studio‘s rates fit within the recording
budget.‖); MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 83.
387. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 4.
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and non-featured vocalists to hire.388 The selection of the producer is
a bit more involved. To the record company, selection of the producer
is one of the more important provisions of the recording contract.389
These provisions usually state that the producer will be mutually selected by the artist and record company.390 In practice, however, the
artist selects the producer, the record company consults and generally defers to the artist unless the record company has had a bad experience with the artist‘s choice.391 Thus, it appears that artists and
producers play a large role in hiring assistants.
Paying for those assistants is a bit more complicated. Today, artists pay for third parties out of a recording fund.392 Under this approach, the recording costs and artist‘s advance are combined into a
single fund, and the artist is responsible for paying all recording
costs out of this fund.393 Any money leftover is the artist‘s to keep as
an advance.394 As a result of this payment scheme, recording contracts include clauses specifying that the artist is solely responsible
for paying all third party charges incurred in the production of the
record.395 Because the artist‘s advance and recording costs are combined into one fund that is delivered to the artist to administer396 and
the contract provisions describe the artist as being responsible for
payment, it appears that this factor weighs in favor of the artist being an independent contractor.
Although the recording fund is more common today, it was common for the artist (especially a new artist) to be paid a separate advance and for the recording company to pay the recording costs.397
Although this arrangement suggests that the record companies paid
for assistants, it is important to remember that all of the recording

388. Id.; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 339, at 399 (describing Sheryl Crow‘s testimony
that she decides what musicians she wants to perform on each song, what engineers she
wants to hire to implement her ―sonic vision‖).
389. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 23-24; SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 112.
393. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 338.
394. Id. (―[The recording fund] gives the artist an incentive to minimize the recording
costs, since the unspent portion of the recording fund is paid to the artist as a cash advance.‖); JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY, AND SUCCESS 88 (1994) (―[I]f
the artist‘s expenses do not exceed the recording fund . . . the amount left over is kept by
the artist and treated as an additional advance recoupable from the artist‘s royalties.‖).
395. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 341.
396. The recording fund is customarily distributed at three points: (1) upon commencement of recording, (2) upon completion of the basic tracks, and (3) upon delivery of the finished master to the record company. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 23-24.
397. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 338; BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note
394, at 88.
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costs are treated as advances to the artist.398 As a result, these costs
are recoupable from the artist‘s royalties.399 Because of this, if the
artist earns a sufficient amount of royalties, it is the artist, not the
record company, who pays for the recording costs.400 Of course, if the
artist is never successful, then the record company will not recoup
these costs and will end up paying for them. Who ultimately pays for
the assistants under the older method of payment depends on whether the artist‘s album is a commercial success.
In sum, this factor probably weighs in favor of artists and, to a
lesser extent, producers being independent contractors. Regardless of
how these assistants are paid, the artist and producer choose who
works on the recording. When a recording fund is used, the case for
independent contractor is strengthened. However, if the record company did not use a recording fund and the costs are not recouped,
then the record company will have a stronger argument that this factor weighs in favor of the artist and producer being employees.
(e) Group #5
Concluding with the least important group of factors, the first factor to consider is the right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished. Whether this factor weighs in favor of
artists and producers being independent contractors or employees is
difficult to determine. Prior to the 1970s, record companies exercised
a large amount of creative control over the recording process, but
since then, artists and producers have moved away from an in-house
creative process and are exercising more creative control in recording.401 Today, for newer artists and producers, the record companies
may have language in the recording contracts requiring the artist
and producer to submit written recording budgets specifying who the
producer is and the financial agreement between the artist and producer, the songs to be recorded, the accompaniment and arrangement
of the recordings, any recording fees that will exceed union scale, the
dates and locations of the recordings and mixing, and the estimated
costs of these sessions.402 Despite this contract language, in practice,
398. BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 394, at 88-89.
399. Id.; SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 112 (―Although the record company will pay the
recording costs initially, it will charge them to [the artist] as advances against [the artist‘s]
royalties as and when earned.‖); WEISSMAN, supra note 370, at 54.
400. SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 106.
401. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 3; Nimmer & Menell, supra note 339, at 393
(describing the Register of Copyrights as noting that ―record companies level of involvement has diminished so that now, in many cases, record companies simply provide funds at
the ‗front-end,‘ and distribution at the ‗back-end‘ of a sound recording‘s production‖ (quotation marks omitted)).
402. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 340.
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written recording budgets are not always submitted or followed.403
More experienced artists and producers may, however, secure more
control over the creative process, including the selection of music, recording location and time, final sound mix, and recording budgets.404
As a general matter, the record companies may have a better chance
at artists and producers being employees under the right to control
factor when the artists and producers are inexperienced. But the
amount of control over the creative process wanes as artists and producers get more experience.
Specific components of recording that are important in the creative process are controlling music selection, monitoring what takes
place during recording sessions, and selecting where the recording
occurs. For music selection, the standard recording contract provides
that the record company will select the music to be recorded.405 But in
practice, the record company gives the artist a say in the decision.406
It is common today for the record company to only reserve a right of
approval of the music selection.407 This is especially true for more
seasoned artists.408 That said, there are actually very few disputes
about song choice.409
With respect to where the recording occurs, as discussed in connection with the work location, record companies try to include
clauses giving the record company approval rights of the recording
studio.410 In practice, the producer will normally choose the studio to
work in,411 and the record companies will approve any legitimate studio.412 In addition to where the recording occurs, recording contracts
typically contain a provision that the record company has the right to
have a representative present to supervise the recording session.413

403. Id.
404. See SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 122-23.
405. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra
note 329, at 13.
406. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 13.
407. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332.
408. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 19.
409. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332.
410. Id. at 331 (―The masters recorded hereunder by Artist shall be recorded in a recording studio selected or approved by Company at such times as Company may designate
or approve.‖); MULLER, supra note 363, at 82.
411. WEISSMAN, supra note 370, at 48.
412. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 332 (―Generally, the record company
will approve any recording studio the artist or the artist‘s producer wishes to use, so long
as it has satisfactory recording equipment and the studio‘s rates fit within the recording
budget.‖); MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 83.
413. SIEGEL, supra note 363, at 112-13.
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Nonetheless, it is very rare for record companies to actually send a
representative to the studio to supervise.414
Although it appears that record companies actually exercise very
little control over the creative process, they do reserve the right to do
so in the recording contracts they enter into with artists and producers. As this factor really focuses on the right to control instead of actual control, which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Reid, it is
likely that this factor will weigh in favor of artists and producers being considered employees.
The second factor in this group is the label the hired and hiring
party use to describe the hired party. This factor certainly weighs in
favor of artists and producers being deemed employees. Nearly every
recording contract written since 1978 states that the works created
by artists and producers are works made for hire.415 Although many
of the terms of a recording contract are negotiable, this one is not.416
The final factor in the least important group of factors is whether
the hiring party is in business. Record companies are obviously in
business.417 This factor clearly weighs in favor of the artists and producers being employees.
(f) Conclusions for the Music Industry
Table 6, below, summarizes the analysis of the Reid factors as applied to sound recordings in the music industry. This table sorts the
factors by order of importance. A checkmark indicates this factor
likely weighs in favor of that party‘s favored position (i.e. independent contractor for artist and producers, employees for record companies). A question mark indicates that it is unclear which way that
factor applies.

414. Id.
415. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][2][a][ii][II] (―[V]irtually all contracts that artists signed with record companies from 1972 onwards have contained
acknowledgements of their contributions constituting works for hire.‖); Nimmer & Menell,
supra note 339, at 396; see also MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 90; SCHULENBERG, supra
note 336, at 148, 150.
416. See BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS‘N, supra note 336, at 390.
417. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 329, at 203.
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Table 6 – Summary of Sound Recording Analysis
Factor

Artists

Producers

Tax Treatment
Employee Benefits


?



Payment Method





Additional Projects
Skill Required
Source of
Instrumentalities & Tools
When & How Long
to Work








 or neutral

 or neutral

? – new
 – established

? – new
 – established

Part of Regular Business
of Hiring Party

Record
Companies
? (artists)
 (artists)

? (new artists &
producers)


Relationship Duration



Work Location





Hiring & Paying
Assistants





 (artists)

Right to Control
Manner & Means



Label



Hiring Party in Business



As illustrated in Table 6, it is nearly certain that producers will be
treated as independent contractors. Five, and possibly six, of the
most important factors weigh in favor of producers as independent
contractors. In fact, the only factors suggesting producers would be
employees are the part of the regular business of the hiring party and
the three least important factors on the continuum.
The case for artists is more difficult. Nonetheless, it is more likely
that artists will be deemed independent contractors. Of the three
most important factors, two clearly weigh in favor of artists as independent contractors. The other factor (employee benefits) is unclear.
As described earlier, when a party has two of these three factors in
its favor, the courts find in favor of that party eighty-seven percent of
the time.418 Expanding this to the next group of factors, one favors
the record companies, one favors the artists, and the remaining factor either favors the artists or is neutral. If a court were to rule that
either the employee benefits or source of the instrumentalities factor
favored the artists, then a majority of the top six factors would favor
the artists. As described earlier, when a party has a majority of these
six factors in its favor, the courts find in favor of that party ninetyone percent of the time.419 The next group of factors favors the record
418. See supra Figure 2.
419. See supra Figure 2.
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companies when the artist is new and is split two to one when the
artist is established. This group is helpful to the record companies,
but they face an uphill battle given that the more important factors
favor artists. The fourth group of factors favors artists, which tips the
scales slightly more towards artists being considered independent
contractors. However, the least important factors all support the record companies. Of course, these are the least important factors, so
their utility to the record company is of little value. Given the results
of the most and second-most important groups of factors, this will
likely carry the day and artists will be deemed independent contractors. That said, the record companies have a colorable argument that
artists should be treated as employees, and this argument should not
be considered futile.420 Hopefully, the results of this study and the
analysis above provide a useful roadmap for litigants and judges navigating the upcoming termination of transfer cases.
3. Business Planning
In addition to assisting litigators to evaluate and present their
cases, the results of this study will aid business planners in structuring relationships between hiring and hired parties. For example, if a
hiring party seeks initial ownership of the copyright, it will be best
advised to withhold income taxes and issue a W2 rather than a 1099,
provide employee benefits such as life and health insurance, and pay
the hired party at regularly intervals. To further ensure a work made
for hire result, the hiring party could also include a provision in the
agreement that reserves the right for the hiring party to assign additional projects to the hired party. And although difficult to control in
some circumstances, the hiring party should provide as many of the
tools as possible. Structuring the relationship this way forces the
three most important factors and one or two of the factors in the second group to weigh in favor of employee status. This should all but
assure a conclusion that the hired party will be an employee.
Likewise, for attorneys representing hired parties who would like
to retain initial ownership—to take advantage of the termination of
transfer provisions or to further exploit the copyright—they should
insist on the hiring party not withholding taxes and issuing a 1099,
refuse insurance coverage, and demand payment upon completion of
projects or portions of projects. Submitting invoices to the hiring party upon completion would be a wise practice to adopt. Moreover, resisting a provision to accept additional projects and actually refusing
additional projects until a new agreement is established for a new

420. See Mark H. Jaffe, supra note 337, at 165 (―[I]t would be futile for a record company to press this argument in litigation.‖).
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project will place the hired party in a strong position to argue that
she is an independent contractor.
Of course, negotiating these terms may heavily depend on bargaining power. A weak hired party may not be able to demand that
no additional projects be assigned. Likewise, a weak hiring party
may not be able to insist that the hired party work on the hiring party‘s premises. But knowing where the various factors lie on the continuum may help the attorney for the weaker party focus on specific
factors that the stronger party may be willing to budge on. If choosing between asking the stronger party to capitulate with respect to a
provision about where the hired party will physically work and a
provision concerning the hours of the day the hired party must work,
the attorney for the weaker party should focus negotiation efforts on
the working hours provision, because it is more important than the
work location factor.
V. CONCLUSION
Drawing a distinction between employees and independent contractors in the work made for hire doctrine is a challenging endeavor,
but one that strikes at the heart of many copyright disputes. After a
quarter century of cases applying and interpreting the Supreme
Court‘s multifactor test from CCNV v. Reid, this Article gives the
first comprehensive study of this multifactor test and answers the
question of which factors are the most and least important in these
analyses. Some of the results are surprising while other results are
expected. But regardless of how these results conform to our expectations, they will prove useful to the bench and bar involved in copyright litigation and for business planning attorneys advising their
clients how to accomplish their copyright ownership goals.

